“Putin’s Return to the Presidency and Its Implications for Asia”

November 22, 2011 | By ED | Category: Security Analysis

by Shigeki Hakamada (AJISS-Commentary No.137) 







PM Putin prepares for the second presidency 



A good six months before the actual presidential election, it was virtually
certain that Vladimir Putin would return to the presidency. Such is the strange
"democracy" of Russia. The announcement was followed by Putin's call to create a
Eurasian Union. The plan, unveiled in a newspaper article on October 4, is to
achieve EU-style economic integration based on Russia's customs union with
Kazakhstan and Belarus that would eventually encompass the whole Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS).

One needs to note, however, that Russia is currently experiencing conflict,
mistrust, or friction in its relations with Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Moldova. Georgia withdrew from the CIS after fighting a war against Russia.
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have been taking independent stances from Russia.
Putin's recent remarks, which suggested his intention to annex South Ossetia and
establish a Soviet-style alliance with Belarus, provoked a local backlash. Given
the current state of affairs, Putin's plan for the Eurasian Union should be
taken more as a reflection of his political ambition to reestablish Russia's
leadership in the former Soviet Union region than as a realistic economic
objective. It is also an expression of his wish to revive the Russian-led CIS as
a potential rival to the EU and China. That is why Russia's move is being
criticized as imperialistic within and outside the country.

Under the tandem government of Putin as prime minister and Dmitry Medvedev as
president, Russia's military spending has been boosted despite growing budget
deficits. Eyed as the most promising Russian leader after Putin and Medvedev,
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin was asked to resign by Medvedev in September
after criticizing the expanding military spending, a fact later acknowledged by
Putin. Such was Russia's resolve to continue to build up its military strength.

How will all this affect Putin's policy towards Asia, particularly Japan and the
rest of the Far East? The most pressing issues facing Russia's Asia policy are
the following: 1) restoring Russia's political, economic and military presence
in the Asia-Pacific region lost after the collapse the Soviet Union; 2) building
cooperative relations with an economically and militarily rising China while
hedging against future threats; and 3) making effective use of a "US card" to
play against China's military build-up and aggressive maritime moves, while
countering the deployment of US missile defense systems. Stemming from these
strategic calculations is a cautious view within Russia about America's
declining presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

A notable thing about Russia's recent foreign policy is Medvedev's effort to
improve economic and military relations with North Korea. Through a trilateral
project to construct a gas pipeline that would pass through North Korea to South
Korea, Russia is determined to reinforce its presence on the Korean Peninsula
and in East Asia on the back of energy resources. The project also serves
Russia's efforts to manipulate China, with which talks on gas prices are
stalled. However, whether the project will come to fruition remains to be seen,
given that it entails similar risks exposed in the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes.
North Korea for its part is counting on the Russian-led project to reduce its
dependence on China - thus the project is a way for North Korea to manipulate
China as well.

Putin tried to redress the balance against China by emphasizing the progress
made in bilateral political and economic cooperation when he visited Beijing on
October 11 and 12. It was his way of using the "China card" against the West.
However, Russia does not conceal its vigilance against China, as was
demonstrated by the announcement several days prior to Putin's visit to Beijing
of the arrest of a Chinese spy. Russia's military build-up in Asia is of course
targeted at the US, but it has been increasingly taking on a counter-China
aspect in recent years. If China continues its expansionism and military
build-up, there will come a time when Japan and the US seriously consider making
use of the "Russia card."

As for relations with Japan, Medvedev has taken a hardline stance on the
Northern Territories despite his reputation as being on the liberal side. The
Japanese government was baffled when its optimistic expectations were betrayed.
In an effort to erase his negative image as a "weak leader," Medvedev sometimes
resorts to tough measures to court the Silovik (politicians from the security or
military services). This has given rise to an optimistic view within Japan that
the dispute over the Northern Territories will develop to Japan's advantage when
Medvedev is replaced by Putin. This is nonsense. We should not forget that it
was Putin who altogether rejected traditional peace treaty negotiations in 2005
by stating that the Southern Kuril Islands had become Russian territories as a
result of World War II and that this was recognized under international law. We
should not rush in dealing with issues pertaining to national sovereignty: we
need to be prepared to fight a long battle. 

At the same time, I would like to add that it is highly likely that Putin
will choose to visit Japan soon after the presidential election next spring in
order to turn around soured Japanese public opinion for the sake of advancing
bilateral economic cooperation.

****************
AJISS-Commentary is an occasional op-ed type publication of The Association of
Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies (AJISS) consisting of three leading
Japanese think tanks: Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), The
Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and Research Institute for
Peace and Security (RIPS).  

[Shigeki Hakamada is Professor of Russian Studies at Aoyama Gakuin University.
The views expressed in this piece are the author's own and should not be
attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies.]

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/201111/22-1.html

Kazakhstan – From Regional Discourse to Global Security

March 22, 2011 | By ED | Category: Security Analysis

ISN from ETH Zurich/Switzerland highlights a new emerging regional power in Central Asia and beyond: Kazakhstan. Interesting read.

…………………………………………

21 March 2011
Kazakhstan – From Regional Discourse to Global Security

In its 20 years since independence, Kazakhstan has emerged as an economic and political power in the region and beyond. Most recently, the country’s ambitions have been evidenced in its commitment to strategic dialogue initiatives, where it aims to serve as an economic, political, security and cultural bridge in world affairs.

By Roman Muzalevsky for ISN Insights

Kazakhstan’s economic capabilities and political influence have grown considerably since the 1990s, although the country still confronts the challenge of building a more diversified market economy and more vibrant democratic polity. As the world’s ninth largest country with a population of15.5 million, resource-rich Kazakhstan boasts a$ 193.8 billion economy – bigger than the four other Central Asian economies combined. It is among the world’s top oil and gas producers (25th in gas, 18th in oil) and is contiguous with the Caspian region believed to contain the world’s largest deposits of oil and gas after the Persian Gulf and Russia. Its people today enjoy an estimated average GDP per capita of$12,500, far larger than the$1,647 in 1990. Kazakhstan has also expanded trade and investment, furthering its integration into the global economy – evidenced by the strong impact of the global financial crisis on its domestic economy, its new membership in theCustoms Union and its plans to join the WTO.

Kazakhstan’s location, resources, relatively effective public institutions and fairly stable socio-economic conditions have ensured these domestic gains and facilitated the country’s efforts to serve as an economic, political, security and cultural ‘bridge’ in world affairs.

Kazakhstan is evolving as a focal point in Eurasia for rapidly growing inter-continental trade and energy linkages. It is stimulating the flow of goods and services across Central Asia to involve neighboring Russia in the North, the dynamic but energy-dependent EU to the West, rapidly rising yet strategically competitive China and India in Southeast Asia, and emerging but arguably revisionist Turkey in the already volatile Middle East. Currently, Kazakhstan exports its energy resources to China and Russia, while serving as a transit territory for the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline. It is also interested in joining the Nabucco gas pipeline scheme to bring Caspian hydrocarbons directly to the EU. Recently, the Kazakh government secured a $2 billion loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the $5.32 billion Western Europe-Western China transport corridor project.

Promoting strategic dialogue

The country’s geographic reach and overall economic potential, including its ability to serve as a transit point, complements and enhances its promising ability to pursue strategic bridge initiatives to secure its own position on the global stage while promoting the interests of other actors. This particularly concerns the country’s role in advancing a dialogue agenda at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), where Astana’s active involvement is not only reflective of Kazakhstan’s rising regional profile but also of its unique position as the country with a secular government, largely Muslim, but ethnically and religiously diverse society and relatively modern emerging economy. All of these characteristics have co-existed in what is still a young nation-state – despite countercurrents in the form of rising nationalism and a rigid political landscape – allowing it to exercise an active role in the OSCE, SCO and OIC.

Advancing ‘indivisible security’ from Vancouver to Vladivostok

Indeed, on 1-2 December, Astana hosted the OSCE’s Heads of State Summit to address the most pressing security challenges spanning North America and Eurasia from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The meeting was organized for the first time in 11 years. But the summit was unique for another reason, as Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev himself stated: “The uniqueness of our summit … [is that] it is taking place in the heart of Eurasia, a thousand miles from the geographical boundaries of Europe. This above all reflects the changed paradigm of European security.”

The summit also emphasized the need for tolerance and stability in Central Asia, which has seen violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and has faced security challenges centered on Afghanistan.

Kazakhstan believes it is essential to advance ‘indivisible security’ in the Euro-Atlantic region and Eurasia. In his address to 56 OSCE member-states, Nazarbaev put the mission of the organization and his country this way: “Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe was reunited. I am of the opinion that today we are demolishing another wall – the wall between Europe and Asia.”

While this goal has yet to be achieved, Astana could play an important role in the process, just as it did when it agreed to forgo the world’s fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the 1990s as part of the global efforts to stem WMD proliferation. Today, it seeks to further support security and strategic dialogue between and within the Euro-Atlantic zone and Eurasia.

Building security bridges between Eurasia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia

Kazakhstan also relies on the SCO to build security bridges in a post-Soviet space that is rapidly expanding to accommodate the interests of new actors from Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Created in 2001, the SCO is a regional body made up of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with Iran, India, Mongolia and Pakistan holding observer status. As of 2007, SCO members and observers possessed17.5 percent of the world’s known oil reserves,47-50 percent of its natural gas reserves, and 45 percent of its population. Like the OSCE, the SCO has long faced pressures from within and without, preventing the group from fully utilizing its declared goals of deepening political, security and economic ties.

Yet many view the platform afforded by the SCO as necessary to promote security in the broader region known best for instability in Afghanistan, tense Indo-Pakistani and Uzbek-Tajik ties, and strategically competitive engagements among India, China, Russia and the US. In this context, Kazakhstan seems to be positioning itself as an advocate of another regional security dialogue. On 22-23 February, it hosted an international security forum in the SCO framework, and will soon host the anniversary meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of States, which will take place in Astana on 15 June.

Supporting religious dialogue between the West and the Muslim world

Kazakhstan has made further attempts to encourage strategic dialogue by chairing the OIC this coming June. The OIC consists of 57 countries whose combined population represents more than one fifth of the world’s total. Astana views its role in the OIC as highly relevant and constructive in the midst of recent protests across the Muslim world, and given the need to promote civilizational, security and religious dialogue within and between the Muslim and the Western world.

To do so, Kazakhstan will count on its own unique historical, social and economic experience. Not only is it a multi-religious society with a largely Muslim population, but it has also been fairly successful in preserving social stability, resting on a modernizing, albeit still transitioning, economy and multiple, yet still evolving, ethnic, national and religious identities. Home to 130 ethnic groups and more than 4,000 religious associations representing 46 faiths , Astana last year initiated and secured UN approval to make 2010 the International Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures.

At the OIC, Kazakhstan will most likely attempt to build deeper relations between Central Asia and the larger Muslim world, while promoting women’s rights and cooperation between the OSCE and OIC, not least on inter-faith issues, as well as security issues, such as narcotics trafficking, the war in Afghanistan, and transnational terrorism. As Secretary General of the OIC Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu observed, “The goals and objectives of the OIC are not much different from those of the OSCE, as both our organizations are devoted to the cause of international peace and security.” Astana’s Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 and OIC in 2011 could facilitate this very synergy between the countries of these two groups.

Kazakhstan’s success hinges on long-term cooperation among numerous actors, a challenge given that many of them exhibit conflicting interests. Kazakhstan also still has a long way to go to further its domestic and foreign agendas – but its strategic dialogue initiatives to build more bridges to the world demonstrate that progress is possible.

Roman Muzalevsky is a writer on Eurasian affairs and security for the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, DC. He holds a Master’s in International Affairs with a concentration in Security and Strategy Studies from Yale University. He can be reached at muzalevsky@hotmail.com.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&id=127821&contextid734=127821&contextid735=127552&tabid=127552127821

Interesting podcast of Maritime security

March 14, 2011 | By AD | Category: Security Analysis

Maritime Security: very interesting ISN Podcast with Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, Vice President of the CNA’s Center for Naval Analysis and Director of CNA Strategic Studies,

Source by www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/

The Economist on China’s territorial claims

January 12, 2011 | By AD | Category: Security Analysis

the Economist has lots of good videos on development and security, and I would like to post some of them from time to time now. Here is the first one

Valuable Read on South Korea’s Navy Developments “South Kora’s SLOC Dilemma”

January 7, 2011 | By AD | Category: Security Analysis

This assessment was first published in Risk Intelligence’s regular Strategic Insight (# 20) in December 2009.

***

By Mingi Hyun, Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy

In recent years, the security of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) has surfaced as a highly publicised international issue largely due to the former insecurity within the Malacca Strait as well as the ongoing multinational anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. However, threats against SLOCs are by no means new, and they have emerged in one form or another for centuries. The recent threats against SLOCs have come from non-state actors, namely pirates and terrorists. When viewed within the context of both post-Cold War western military operations and the ongoing global war against terrorism, contemporary SLOC security may appear to involve largely, if not exclusively, non-state, or asymmetric, threats. However, the tendency to accentuate the asymmetric at the expense of the symmetric increasingly appears to be a Western manoeuvre. In East Asia, SLOC security has been perceived as an issue with both asymmetric and symmetric dimensions. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is one country that faces such threats and challenges near and abroad.

Korea’s blue-water construction

Since the end of the Cold War, international attention on Korean security has revolved heavily around North Korea’s nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs. Under this shadow, South Korea has quietly and rapidly modernised its armed forces to take on threats beyond North Korea, namely neighbouring countries. While the South Korean Ministry of National Defence does not name the individual countries, recent opinions expressed by South Korean security experts indicate the countries of foremost concern to be China and Japan. Additionally, a 2006 survey conducted by the state-run Korea Institute for Defence Analyses reveals the South Korean general public selecting China as the greatest threat to their future.

Such threat perceptions have pushed all branches of the South Korean military into a comprehensive modernisation program. While the country’s army and air force have made noticeable developments, no other service has been as heavily influenced by the expanding threat perception as the navy.

The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) began its blue-water construction during the late 1990’s, when its procurement programmes for major surface combatants, such as ocean-going destroyers and flat-deck helicopter carriers, saw noticeable increases in quantity. Since then, the ROKN has procured six 4,500-ton Chungmugong Yi Sun-Shin class (KDX-2) destroyers and is in the process of acquiring three 7,500-ton Sejong the Great class (KDX-3) AEGIS-equipped destroyers. Additionally, the country’s submarine capabilities have been drastically enhanced with the ongoing pursuit of nine 1,800-ton Son Won-Il class (Type 214) air-independent propulsion submarines. The most telling sign of all has been the ROKN’s procurement of the 18,000-ton helicopter carrier, ROKS Dokdo. Equipped with a flat flight deck, ROKS Dokdo has been subject to debates on whether it was built as an aircraft carrier. In addition to these vessels, the ROKN’s ocean-going vessels will likely increase in quantity and quality over the next several decades.

The reasons behind the ROKN’s unprecedented expansion are manifold. The ROKN does indeed intend to conduct multinational peace/stability operations in distant waters on behalf of the country’s national interest while under the aegis of both the United Nations and multinational coalitions. This is evident in the ROKN’s ongoing deployment in the Gulf of Aden as a member of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151).

However, the ROKN faces the task of undertaking another type of operation in distant waters: symmetric naval operations. As is the case with the country’s army and air force, the ROKN was modernised with conventional armed forces as its primary concern. These conventional capabilities face a realistic possibility of being employed to confront locally originating threats in distant theatres of operation. In other words, the ROKN may need to address concerns posed by other North East Asian navies in extra-regional theatres. Such concerns may emerge in the shape of threats against South Korea’s use of SLOCs outside of North East Asia.

North-East Asia’s naval build-up & South Korea

While global reach may not be the aim of a neighbouring country’s army or air force, all North-East Asian navies, aside from North Korea, have aspirations to conduct maritime operations outside of the immediate area. In the case of China and Japan, their likely areas of operation appear primarily to reside in North-East Asia, South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean. These desired areas of operation consist of SLOCs through which the vast majority of South Korean oil and gas imports pass.

Such build-ups have occurred while in the midst of brewing tensions in the maritime domain that many perceive may lead to conflict. These include the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island, Sino-Taiwanese dispute over Taiwan’s independence and the multi-party dispute over the Spratly Islands between China and several South-East Asian countries.

Should any of these tensions fruition into war, South Korea’s access to SLOCs may become jeopardised for an uncertain period of time. For a country which depends almost entirely on the sea for its energy imports, South Korean observers have noted that in such instances, the ROKN may need to be deployed to provide support or escort of commercial vessels headed to and from South Korea.

The political instruments to be employed by the conflicting governments will be navies. In turn, should the South Korean government, or any other third party, desire to contribute in efforts to resolve, or at least temporarily halt, these seabourne conflicts, the deployment of their own navies may be required to either assist in enforcing peace during conflict or “keeping peace” after conflict so that stability may be reestablished in waters which consist of or are near key SLOCs.

However, aside from the Sino-Japanese dispute, there exists a noticeable gap in naval capabilities between China and the countries with whom it is in dispute. Further exacerbating this gap are two developments: the build-up of the People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF) and the pursuit of naval facilities outside of mainland China. Such drastic differences between the disputing parties place a higher capability requirement for intervening third-party navies.

PLANAF air bases along China’s eastern and southern coastlines enable the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to project three dimensional capabilities into these areas of dispute. Currently, of the East Asian powers, only China is capable of deploying such large air assets into these areas in a sustained and prolonged manner. It is also public knowledge that the PLAN will be adding a fleet of aircraft carriers over the mid to long term. In other words, aside from the United States Navy (USN), no East Asian armed force has the three-dimensional capability to match, or balance, China at sea in order to enforce peace or to mediate between disputing governments. Only the pursuit of aircraft carriers would assist the likes of South Korea and Japan in balancing Chinese capabilities in order to deter or water down a conflict involving China. Both countries are rumoured to be interested in converting existing ships into a carrier or pursuing a carrier platform, as evident in the ROKN’s Dokdo class vessel and Japan’s 14,000-ton Hyuga class and the planned 28,000-ton 22DDH vessels. However, whether carrier-based fighter jets will be employed aboard these ships remains unknown.

China has also been constructing naval installations and deep-water ports accessible by major surface combatants along key sea lanes and within close proximity of key chokepoints. In addition to the Chinese territory of Hainan Island, publicly available sources indicate China to have completed or currently pursuing such facilities in Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. These facilities are stretched across waters that connect East Asia with the Middle East, Africa and Europe, and they may very well thicken China’s force gradient along key SLOCs.

While it has been understood that China intends to use its island and overseas facilities to defend against potential hostility against its distant interests, East Asian countries engaged in disputes with China may face difficulty accepting such reasoning as wholly sincere. While China may be able to defend its maritime assets against potential hostility, China’s acquisition of these facilities provides China with the ability to engage in naval warfare against the navies and maritime assets, such as transiting commercial vessels and stationary oil and gas platforms, belonging to countries over whom China may wish to exercise a degree of political control. While naval facilities on Hainan may directly affect conflicts in South-East Asia, the other facilities may be used in an indirect manner to coerce the seabourne commercial assets of opposing countries so as to test and reduce their political will in a given conflict or dispute.

As a result, third-party interventions into these theatres of conflict, whether in the form of peace enforcement or peace-keeping, may be a greater likelihood for countries that possess sophisticated naval capabilities at par or beyond those had by a future PLAN. Additionally, these navies must possess the ability to deploy a quantity of vessels for a prolonged period of time in an overseas theatre. Not only do the candidate countries include regional countries, namely South Korea, Japan and Singapore, but also include European navies which may experience a greater degree of ease exercising neutrality.

For South Korea, as well as Japan, should they desire to act as regional leaders in leading efforts to secure regional stability, it is important they maintain a certain level of naval presence close to or within those theatres, as the timing of the aforementioned conflicts may very well be uncertain. Should they occur, they may break out unexpectedly and without little or no prior warning. Forward deployment may permit the ability to suppress the scale of a sudden conflict by minimising the possibility of escalation.

A prime example may be found in South Korea’s West Sea, where the ROKN engaged the Korean People’s Navy (KPN) during the First and Second Yeonpyeong naval battles of 1999 and 2002 and the recent Daecheong Naval Battle of 2009. The West Sea has been an area ripe with tension for several decades, due to a maritime boundary dispute between the two Koreas.

The three incidents remain the only violent altercations between East Asian navies in recent memory, and all of them occurred suddenly and unexpectedly. While North Korean intentions behind instigating these incidents are unknown, South Korean experts remain divided as to whether these skirmishes were pre-meditated by North Korean leaders with political intentions or were voluntary actions committed by the sailors onboard. In other words, while political leaders may order minor skirmishes to test the opponent’s political will, it is also possible that sailors operating in tense waters may have acted on their own initiative absent of authorization. With regards to the latter, it is important to note that while governments may have more time to ponder decisions, the uniformed servicemen and servicewomen have mere seconds to make decisions when operating in areas ripe with tension, all the while pursuing the simultaneous duty of protecting their country and their own personnel. Should such minor altercations break out in disputed areas, the oft-uncontrollable fate of escalation remains a possibility.

The resulting casualties and collateral damage of the Korean naval battles were quite limited, while further escalations were fortunately prevented. Nevertheless, despite their significantly limited nature, these incidents were followed by temporary cessation of commercial activity in surrounding waters. Due to the location of the Korean naval skirmishes, the affected commercial vessels were known to have been fishing vessels. However, should such sudden seabourne conflicts occur around Taiwan or in the South China Sea, the effects are likely to influence commercial access to SLOCs, while their after effects may be far greater than those seen in the West Sea. Simply put, while the two Koreas fortunately decided against escalation, forward deployment of a third party navy in future regional conflicts may be crucial in maintaining or re-establishing SLOC security, as doing so may create opportunities to limit a conflict in its early stages prior to the commencement of escalation.

Challenges of symmetric SLOC security operations

In order for South Korea to undertake SLOC security operations to address the aforementioned symmetric concerns, South Korea may need to continue on a path it has pursued to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden: multinational coalitions.

Through CTF-151, the ROKN, along with a host of other navies, has already benefited international interests. However, the ROKN could not have achieved such a feat had it pursued a unilateral path. Having to defend South Korea’s land and maritime territories from neighbouring countries, the ROKN is currently incapable of deploying a significant portion of its ocean-going fleet for overseas operations. Additionally, due to differing interest groups within the South Korean defence community, the ROKN is unable to pursue naval construction of desired scale. In turn, whether the ROKN is to confront asymmetric or symmetric opponents in distant waters, a coalition approach is a requisite. However, forming coalitions to confront symmetric threats will not be an easy task.

Asymmetric threats can be tackled through multinational coalitions. In turn, contributing navies tend to deploy a rather small portion of their overall capabilities to multinational coalitions that essentially burden-shares across a number of governments. Additionally, because non-state groups are often not sponsored by a national government, deploying national military capabilities against them may possess a greater degree of acceptance amongst a wider group of countries. The ongoing UN-sanctioned operations in the Gulf of Aden are an ideal example. After all, it is usually difficult to imagine the USN and the PLAN operating on the same side in the same theatre on behalf of a similar cause.

However, symmetric threats against SLOCs will likely occur in a rather different political environment. The aforementioned symmetric SLOC security operations will involve national navies. In turn, political sensitivities may make the formation of multinational coalitions relatively difficult. Additionally, while sophisticated ship design and weapons capabilities are not required for the likes of anti-piracy operations, symmetric naval operations will most likely require the more sophisticated navies as long as great power navies are involved in a given conflict or dispute. Therefore, not only will reluctance for participation in multinational coalitions stem from political factors but many governments may find it difficult to participate due to their own limited naval capabilities. In turn, the burden sharing as seen in anti-piracy operations may be far less likely to achieve in symmetric SLOC security operations.

Given such a political environment, the ROKN will likely need to work with navies of a relatively similar level of capability and, equally important, a similar level of political will to engage in such operations on a prolonged and consistent basis. The most likely solution may be found in the framework provided by the USN’s ‘Cooperative Maritime Strategy,’ namely the USN and its “partner” navies.

In January 2008, the South Korean media reported that a ROKN officer was dispatched to the USN’s 5th Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain, in order to expand the reach of the US-ROK alliance, as well as to establish an operational framework to enable US-ROK naval operations in the Indian Ocean. While a new development for South Korea, navy officers from approximately 20 other countries are known to be already working with the USN in Bahrain. Though belated, efforts undergoing between the two countries in Bahrain may prove to be the very beginning of a prolonged effort to maintain the security of key SLOCs relevant to the interests of both countries. While the US-ROK alliance has looked toward the Asian continent for decades, the focus of the alliance has recently, but slowly, begun adjusting to contemporary developments by also shifting more “outward” and into the global maritime domain.

The past two decades have seen what some claim to be an end in conventional conflicts. Some have proclaimed war to be “transformed” and stated “old” wars to be over. Such conclusions amount only to simplified generalisations of warfare. War is a political activity that must be observed and predicted with cultural sensitivity. General trends may provide indications, but trends do not always last nor are they always universally applicable.

The same applies to SLOC security. Threats to SLOC security and the operations undertaken to stabilise SLOCs may have thus far required modest naval capabilities to target grossly asymmetric opponents. However, this trend may not endure. North-East Asia is often proclaimed as the centre of the future global economy, while East Asia is often recognised as the burgeoning gem of international economic development. As the more powerful East Asian countries grow wealthier, they will gain a wider array and more powerful policy instruments to exercise their political influence in the manner of their choice. For a region whose member countries are connected mostly through the sea, a key policy instrument will be the navy. And, the behaviour of these navies may dictate regional stability, as they often tread upon the key lifeline of any developed country; SLOCs.

South Korea stands amongst the countries facing such concerns, and these concerns have been reflected in the form of a navy undergoing bluewater construction. As one of few East Asian navies with increasingly expansive capabilities, the ROKN is on path to potentially play a significant role contributing to the interests and stability of South Korea as well as the wider region. However, South Korea cannot pursue such a path alone. In turn, the US-ROK alliance’s burgeoning focus upon the maritime domain is a timely and welcome development. Though belated, it would only be fitting for the two maritime countries, as they look to address shared concerns which may soon no longer reside over the horizon.

Thai navy anti-piracy contingent leaves for international operations off Somali coast

September 7, 2010 | By AD | Category: Security Analysis

Thai navy anti-piracy contingent leaves for international operations off Somali coast
http://www.mcot.net/cfcustom/cache_page/100793.html

BANGKOK, Sept 10 – A Royal Thai Navy anti-piracy contingent with 350 Thai naval personnel left Thailand Friday morning to join the international maritime patrol operations combating piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Two ships, HTMS Pattani and HTMS Similan, have sailed for the Gulf of Aden. The HTMS Pattani is a Chinese-built European-equipped patrol vessel, while HTMS Similan carries the reserve fuel supply.

The departure came following a Cabinet resolution which allowed the Royal Thai Navy to organise and dispatch a flotilla to join the international operation in the Gulf of Aden, off the Somali coast, with the Bt270 million (US$7.7 million) budget allocated for the 98-day mission.

Defence Minister Gen Prawit Wongsuwan presided over the embarkation ceremony of the anti-piracy unit at Sattahip Naval Base in Thailand’s eastern province of Chonburi.

Many relatives, and well-wishers from government and the community gathered there to see off their family members who are participating as part of the Thai navy’s anti-piracy contingent.

The Thai anti-piracy unit will protect and escort Thai cargo and fishing vessels sailing across the piracy-impacted sea routes leading from the Suez Canal, through the Red Sea, and across
the Gulf of Aden.

Rear Admiral Chaiyot Sunthornnak, commander of the Thai navy’s anti-piracy unit, said before the embarkation that navy personnel are now prepared to carry out their duties and
responsibilities in a wider sphere as they have been trained and gained experience in this kind of operation.

He said the operation is the pride of every Thai navy personnel as it makes local people acknowledge the role of the Royal Thai Navy. The world community also welcome the operation as Thailand is not a ‘big’ country but it shows world class responsibility by helping to tackle the widely-affected problem.

The Gulf of Aden is located in the Arabian Sea between Yemen and Somalia. It connects with the Red Sea and it is part of the important Suez Canal shipping route with some 21,000 ships passing through annually.

Increasing piracy and armed robbery in the area has caused economic problems to many countries, especially those whose economies depend on maritime commerce.

Thai-flagged ships have been seized by Somali pirates on several occasions. (MCOT online news)

China/Maritime Security

August 24, 2010 | By AD | Category: Security Analysis

China/Maritime Security is a great overview on the vessels used in the Chinese PLAN, looks like they not only have a massive say in the regional maritime context, but looking also beyond…… interesting numbers, maybe just matched by India and the US Navy, the latter however is engaged in many other assignments as well.