“The Crisis Behind the Crisis?” Forced Migration and its Consequences as a Result of Environmental Change and Natural Disaster in ASEAN

December 16, 2011 | By EZ | Category: Research & Security Studies

 PDF File

The HDFF team had the opportunity to attend the 2011 Chula Global Network Annual Conference at Chulalongkorn University. The conference explored the interchanging relationship between migration and the environment, with a focus on the varying influences on ASEAN nations’ human and spatial security. Through various experts, ranging from individual researchers to representatives from the UNHCR, the social science consortium highlighted the importance of how environmental changes could play a role in changing migration’s patterns, workers’ decisions and lifestyles, affecting long standing communities in both positive and negative ways. Although the analysts had diverse perspectives, all seemed to agree that the overall impact of how the environment will shape migration remains unknown. Reasons for migration range from fleeing from natural disasters to choosing to leave as a result of depletion of resources which inhabitants are dependent upon.  Aside from natural disasters, researchers are hard pressed to find specific documentation and evidence which highlights the environment as a sole primary factor in the decision to leave home; however, environmental change can be understood as an increasingly relevant part of complex factors relating to migration.

Despite the challenges of isolating the environment as part of migration, there is a need to direct effective, preemptive policy and research.  A thoroughly reviewed (and relevant) discussion was Thailand’s recent mass migrations, resulting from the 2011 flooding, and the need to better prepare for the future. Suggested solutions included creating incentives for citizens to move to safer locations and implement stricter zoning laws.  Differing contexts also need to be reviewed, such as which migrants are being forced out of their locations versus which migrants are being forced into their locations. Historically, people adapted to deal with climate patterns, but the question that remains is, will changes overwhelm standard coping mechanisms, and what affect will that have? These types of questions were considered and debated at the conference, which the HDFF team had the pleasure to take part in.

HDFF is currently focusing on researching “The social implications of climate change for land tenure and land policy – Case Studies from ASEAN, Germany and Europe and USA/NAFTA”, supported by the Thai Research Fund.  HDFF looks forward to implementing lessons learned from the conference into our working plan.

Interesting podcast of Maritime security

March 14, 2011 | By AD | Category: Research & Security Studies

Maritime Security: very interesting ISN Podcast with Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, Vice President of the CNA’s Center for Naval Analysis and Director of CNA Strategic Studies,

Source by www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/

MARPAC’s In Focus: Strategic Isles of the East China Sea – February 2011

March 6, 2011 | By ED | Category: Research & Security Studies

Very good article on the situation around disputed islands in the East China Sea. Worthwhile to read.

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Strategic Isles of the East China Sea

February 2011

On September 7^th, 2010, while in waters claimed by Japan as part of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 collided with the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessels Yonakuni and Mizuki 12 kilometres northwest of the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Mandarin) Islands in the East China Sea.  The JCG boarded the Chinese vessel, arrested her captain on illegal fishing charges and detained her 14-strong crew as part of Japan’s rights within its EEZ.

Beijing strongly protested Japan’s detention of the Chinese trawler captain, who was held for a couple weeks longer than the crew, and took several official and unofficial retaliatory measures.  Officially, the Japanese ambassador was summoned four times – including once early in the morning – four Japanese employees of Fujita Corp. working in China were detained on espionage allegations, ministerial-level talks were suspended, and a planned leaders meeting on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Vietnam was aborted.  Unofficially, China suspended exports of rare earth minerals to Japan, citing a renewal of proper customs inspections to prevent smuggling and increased quotas for domestic use.  (Since China mines over 90 percent of the global supply of rare earths, and since the minerals are crucial to high technology goods upon which Japanese manufacturing is based, the move significantly threatened the Japanese economy.)  After two weeks of brinksmanship, Japan eventually released the Chinese captain and tensions somewhat eased, though both countries have since dispatched ships to the Senkakus to monitor the other.

The Senkaku incident returned the islets to the international spotlight and revived the decades-long bilateral (Taiwan also claims ownership of the Senkakus, but since its claim parallels China’s, for the purposes of this article, the Senkaku dispute will be treated as a Japan-China affair) territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing.  The fact that the two regional powers could become so heated over essentially a grouping of rocks – the largest islet in the Senkakus is just over four square kilometres – initially seems odd, but there is more at stake than owning a bit more land.  The great naval strategist Alfred Mahan typified the ocean as a desert, in which any features, such as islands, are prized, and what is in the balance are strategic assets and strategic position.  This In Focus will look at seemingly minor islets in the East China Sea – the Senkakus, and the Miyako and Yonaguni Islands in the Ryukyu chain – and examine what greater significance they hold.

The Senkaku/Diaoyus

The Senkaku/Diaoyus Islands are a group of eight uninhabited islets roughly equidistant (400 kilometres) between the southern Japanese island of Okinawa and the Chinese mainland.  Their ownership has been contested by Tokyo and Beijing since 1971, and since they lie in the middle of competing EEZ claims by both countries, which has made resolving who owns what difficult.  The merits of each side’s case have been described at length elsewhere and are beyond the scope of this article – both countries have convincing arguments for their control of the Senakakus – and of significance is what is around and underneath the islets.

The waters around the Senkakus are home to rich fishing grounds.  As such, both Japan and China are keen to have access to an excellent source of readily available and relatively cheap protein.  More importantly, however, is the nearby presence of potentially rich oil and gas fields, as well as the promise of valuable seabed minerals.

Knowledge of the oil and gas fields dates back to a 1969 UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) report, which states that a “high probability exists that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world.”  This shelf, known as the Xihu/Okinawa (Mandarin/Japanese) Trough, stretches in an arc south from the southern Japanese island of Kyushu to Taiwan, with the Senkakus along the southern edge of the trough.  Chinese and Japanese surveys estimate that Xihu holds up to 160 billion barrels of oil and seven trillion cubic feet of gas.  Perhaps the most well-known of the hydrocarbon fields within the Xihu Trough is the Chunxiao/Shirakaba (Mandarin/Japanese) field.  Chunxiao contains relatively little hydrocarbons (17.9 million barrels of oil and 363.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas, roughly two days and four months worth of consumption in China, according to the US Energy Information Administration).

However, of relevance to this situation is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (the UN treaty that defines national rights and responsibilities in regards to the oceans) provision that a nation has exclusive rights to resources 200 nautical miles out from its shoreline, including offshore islands.  Thus, whomever controls the Senkakus gains exclusive access to a large portion of the East China Sea, including the Xihu Trough.  As such ownership of the Senkakus has wider implications, and Chunxiao, despite its low reserves, represents years worth of hydrocarbons in the Xihu Trough, and is thus symbolically important.  Furthermore, Xihu offers the promise of energy from a nearby, stable source (relative to the Middle East, from where most Chinese and Japanese hydrocarbons come), with China perhaps doubly interested in the gas as part of its efforts to shift away from high-emission coal as its primary energy source.

Negotiations on joint Chunxiao drilling have been made, though progress has been stymied largely due to the Senkakus sovereignty dispute.  Both sides have offered joint development proposals over the years, though these have foundered, especially during Japanese PM Koizumi’s time in office between 2001 and 2006, when overall Sino-Japanese relations worsened.  China has promised not to drill in Chunxiao without Japanese participation, though Tokyo has accused Beijing of drilling in a nearby field, and is concerned that operations in that field are draining hydrocarbons from the Japanese side of the median line.  With the September Minjinyu-JCG incident, Tokyo again accused Beijing of moving in drilling equipment, adding further to the unlikelihood that the issue will be resolved in the near future.

The Ryukyu Islands – Miyako & Yonaguni

Unlike the Senkakus, the Ryukyu chain is undisputedly held by Japan, and backed up by the US.  The Ryukyus’ strategic position is literally illustrated in the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) annual report on China, in which the DoD has postulated two island chains in which China wishes to exert effective maritime control.  The first island chain is demarcated just before the Ryukyus at the edge of the East China Sea, with the second island chain stretching into the Philippine Sea to Guam.  As the US Naval War College’s James Holmes writes, “[f]orces stationed along the island chains can encumber the Chinese navy’s free access to the Western Pacific while inhibiting north-south movement along the Asian seaboard.”  The Miyako Strait, the channel of water between the tiny Miyako Islands and Okinawa in the Ryukyu archipelago, is essentially the primary route for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to move from the East China Sea into the wider Pacific, or for the Japanese and/or US navies to limit the PLAN to its near waters.

The PLAN transited the Miyako Strait twice in 2010, first in March, when a fleet of six ships from the Qingdao-based North Sea Fleet in what was described in the PLA Daily publication as a “long-distance training exercise”, and again in April, when a larger flotilla of ten ships sailed through.  Despite being preceded by a KJ-200 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) plane, the March fleet sailed through the Strait in pairs, presumably to avoid attracting attention, while in contrast, the April operation was meant to signal the PLAN’s intentions: the ten-ship task group – including frigates, destroyers, two Kilo-class diesel-electric attack submarines and auxiliary vessels – made no attempt to hide their presence, with the group sailing in one large formation.  To Tokyo’s alarm, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer Suzunami was buzzed by a PLAN Ka-28 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter, coming within 90 metres of the warship.  The flotilla continued to the east side of Taiwan, where it conducted ASW exercises until it was dispatched to lend muscle to a fishing dispute with Vietnam in the South China Sea.

The PLAN’s transits of the Miyako Strait are part of a larger trend to expand its range and capabilities.  That the PLAN is expanding its reach after decades of remaining close to home is to be expected, but the Miyako Strait, given its proximity to Taiwan, represents an area the PLAN would seek to control against US forces from the eastern Pacific in the event of hostilities.

Also part of the Ryukyu chain is Yonaguni Island, which is just under 30 square kilometres and has a population of 1,600.  Yonaguni’s strategic importance lies in the fact that it is just under 100 kilometres from Taiwan’s east coast, and as such, would provide early warning of PLAN activities toward the first island chain.

Because of its position, Yonaguni has been on Tokyo’s radar for some time, but Tokyo has not acted until recently.  In June 2010, Japan unilaterally extended the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) around Yonaguni 22 kilometres to the west, overlapping the Japanese ADIZ with the Taiwanese zone.    The extension of the Japanese ADIZ requires any planes transiting the zone to seek prior approval from Tokyo, a key difference from normal airspace.  Taipei strongly protested the move, complaining that the ADIZ extension could be used by Japan to strengthen its case for the Senkakus.  However, Tokyo seems prepared to pay the price of worsened relations with Taiwan in order to better monitor Chinese activities in the area.

China’s increasing aggressiveness this past year raised Yonaguni’s profile further.  Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) released in mid-December 2010 stated Tokyo’s intent to guard its non-Home Islands against attack, including posting Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) where they are not currently stationed.  Although Yonaguni was not specifically named in the NDPG, Japanese media reported in November that Tokyo is planning to base 100 GSDF personnel on Yonaguni, the first Japanese troops there since WWII.

Conclusion

These islands in the East China Sea hold importance far greater than their size.  The Senkakus are home to important resources that either Japan or China could use for their energy-intensive economies.  The Ryukyu Islands of Miyako and Yonaguni represent important strategic considerations, for China for untrammeled transit of its near seas, and for the US, Japan and other allies to constrain the PLAN in the event of heightened tensions or hostilities.  To quote James Holmes again, “the island chains resemble a flank or shield against a westward US naval advance”, something Chinese naval planners take very seriously.  Indeed, these East China Sea rocks have high potential for being important issues in future China-Japan-US relations.

The Thinker: Asia vs. the Pirates

February 16, 2011 | By AD | Category: Research & Security Studies

Dr. Sam Bateman | February 12, 2011
Piracy poses a growing maritime security problem for East Asia. The region is home to major shipping nations with some, especially Indonesia and the Philippines, being leading providers of international seafarers.

China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are all heavily dependent upon sea-borne trade through waters at risk of pirate attack off Somalia and in Southeast Asia. Japan is at the forefront of moves to counter piracy in these areas, while China and South Korea have also deployed warships to waters off Somalia.

By far the greatest concentration of piracy globally in 2010 was off the shores of Somalia, but attacks in Southeast Asian waters have also increased. The downturn in international shipping following the global financial crisis led to more freighters laid up in anchorages, such as off Johore, in Malaysia and Vung Tau in Vietnam, where more attacks have occurred. Vessels underway have also been attacked recently around Mangkai and Anambas islands in the South China Sea, although some ships may be loitering in this area while waiting for work, making them more vulnerable to attack.

There is speculation that pirates in Asia might adopt the Somali model of piracy, but this is unlikely. Somali pirates operate out of a lawless land where ships can be held securely while ransoms are negotiated. They are able to operate far offshore.

In contrast, pirates in Southeast Asia do not have the arsenal and coordination of their African counterparts, as well as lacking their range. It’s unlikely that Southeast Asian pirates could hijack a vessel and hold it for ransom without local intelligence agencies foiling their plans.

Japan is heavily involved in global efforts to counter piracy at sea. The nation has actively used its Coast Guard for building local capacity to counter piracy in Southeast Asian waters. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, the nation’s navy, would be unacceptable for operating in this region due to the island nation’s Constitution.

Japan is also instrumental in other important initiatives to improve regional maritime security, including establishment of the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies meetings, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, and the Cooperative Mechanism for Maritime Safety and Environmental Protection in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.

Piracy off Somalia was a critical turning point for the Japanese constitutionality of overseas military deployments. After increasing attacks on Japanese ships and following the example of China, Japan decided to deploy JMSDF ships and aircraft to protect its shipping off Somalia. Japan now plans to open its first overseas military base this year in Djibouti to provide an airfield for maritime patrol aircraft and a permanent port facility for warships.

Shipowners suffer extra costs due to raids, but the ultimate victims of piracy are the seafarers who are exposed to violence during attacks, have their personal valuables stolen or suffer the privations of being held hostage for many months aboard a hijacked ship. The recent incident in which Korean marines killed eight pirates during a successful operation to free a Korean-owned merchant ship from Somali pirate control could lead to escalating violence against seafarers.

Apart from lobbying for increased security efforts by governments, the shipping industry might also do more to ensure that ships are not attacked. There are still many substandard ships at sea, and some vessels are not following best practices and recommended procedures for countering piracy. Professionally operated and maintained vessels with well-trained and efficient crew can take all the proper precautions against attack.

Interestingly, piracy has served the broader strategic interests of the rising powers of Asia — China, India and Japan. All three have sought to play a role in anti-piracy operations both off Somalia and in Southeast Asia, but so far an element of strategic competition has been evident in their initiatives. They have all deployed warships to Somalia and have provided assistance to local security forces both in the Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia. These actions may be as much about regional influence as countering piracy.

Dr. Sam Bateman is a senior fellow and adviser to the Maritime Security Program at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

East Asia Forum

Progress Report Meeting Thai Research Fund Land Policy Forum 11 February 2011

February 12, 2011 | By AD | Category: Research & Security Studies

On 11 February 2011 a strong HDFF team led by HDFF chairman General (ret) Bunchon Chawansin presented first results of the ongoing research on “The ASEAN Free Trade Area and its Social Implications for the Kingdom of Thailand related to Land Rights” which is a cooperation project between HDFF and the Thailand Research Fund (TRF).

Major finding of the examination of the legal frameworks related to land use in EU, NAFTA and AFTA as well as the respective links to the Kingdom of Thailand were presented and discussed. Other topics were the analysis of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows in the EU, NAFTA and AFTA as well as promotion measures of Thailand. To provide lessons learned from other FTAs, including European Integration and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as well as integrate inputs from investors and social groups.

Executive Director Dr. Wilfried A. Herrmann (seated left) presented the findings of the study in front of a group of about 40 experts of the Land policy Forum invited by TRF moderated by Professor Eathipol Srisawaluck (right). After several valuable inputs the session was closed and the team was tasked to finish the study within the next two months. HDFF would like to thank everybody who contributed to the success of this study including our researchers from the United States of America (e.g. Ms. Mai Lan –Ha) and Germany (e.g. Mr. Andreas Berding) as well as the team here in Bangkok including HDFF’s Chairman General (ret) Bunchon Chawansin and our adviser Mr. Sanit.

The research and presentation team from HDFF on 11 February 2011

Continuation of the HDFF-Peace Building Program at AIT-E: 15 Nov 2010 at AIT-E

November 19, 2010 | By MN | Category: Research & Security Studies

Continuation of the HDFF-Peace Building Program at AIT-E:

On 15 November 2010 HDFF Chairman General (ret) Bunchon Chawansin , Prof. Dr. Thanet Aphornsuvan (Thammasat University, Pridi Banomyong International College) and Ajarn Karoon Kooyai  presented their view on “Effective Leadership in Peace Building” based on their research and experiences in Southern Thailand at AIT-E.

All three panelists gave deep insight on the respective historical, military/governmental and Muslim view of the situation in the deep South of Thailand where a long term social unrest is plaguing the people.  Prof.

Thanet explained the historical developments since the early days of the Kingdoms of Siam and Patani and some important historical leaders like Prime Minister Phibun Songkran and his Southern policy.

General (ret) Bunchon focused on his long term experience in the South of Thailand, especially after the change of policy under PM General (ret) Prem Tinsulanonda.

Ajarn Karoon completetd the picture for the 12 attendees of the peace building program from Nepal with his distinguished view on the Muslim perspective of Leadership in Peace Building, which centered around the idea of humanity and fairness.

This presentation was part of a Leadership Development Program of AIT-E for four Joint Secretaries, four Under Secretaries and two section chiefs from the Nepalese Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and one section chief from the Nepalese Ministry of Finance.

The presentation and discussions aimed to share experiences on effective leadership skills in peace building, while on 13 November 2010 the same group enjoyed a full day workshop with HDFF facilitators on general leadership skills like Motivation, delegation and empowerment.

Even though the Thai situation is specific, however, the Nepalese participants indicated that they could draw a lot of lessons learned from these activities for their actual work. These events were part of the ongoing partnership between AIT-E and HDFF in Leadership Development and Peace Building programs.

The ASEAN Free Trade Area and its Social Implications for the Kingdom of Thailand related to Land Rights

September 30, 2010 | By AD | Category: Research & Security Studies

A cooperation project between

The Human Development Forum Foundation and

The Thailand Research Fund 2010

During the next 10 years, ASEAN will strive to meet its vision enunciated in its ASEAN Vision 2020 creating a grouping that is, “outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring society.”  To meet this goal, a number of mechanisms and platforms have been created to promote the 3 pillars of ASEAN: Security, Economic, and Socio-Cultural Communities. At the forefront of these efforts is its attempt to formalize the ASEAN Economic community. During its 2003 meeting, the ASEAN Heads of State signed the “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II” moving forward the implementation of the Economic Community pillar from 2015 to 2010.

Therefore, ASEAN has accelerated its integration practice, establishing a number of mechanisms to implement its economic integration commitment including the ASEAN Free Trade Area and the Framework Agreement on Services, and Investment Area.  Its overall goal to create a single market and production base requires liberalization of markets and services, but also mechanisms for the free flow of labor and investment. Since January 2010 the AFTA regulations are easing the way for more direct investment between the member states as well as lowering the tariffs for several groups of goods. These new regulations will also creating a more liberalized market for land.  This will cause different economic and social impacts on the land use in ASEAN member countries, especially as for most developing countries the land issue is much more important and socially significant because the primary sector normally contributes a much bigger part to the national income compared to industrial countries. Therefore a transition period with a step by step adjustment can be a reasonable option, especially among AFTA participants. A crucial condition however is, that such adjustment arrangements support the long-term integration and do not serve as a tool of ongoing protectionism.

Against this backdrop and the strong research capacity of HDFF the Thai Research Fund (TRF) and HDFF started in August 2010 a cooperation project on a study titled “The ASEAN Free Trade Area and its Social Implications for the Kingdom of Thailand related to Land Rights”.

The objectives of the study are

•      To examine what the AFTA may mean for land rights and land use in SEA, but specifically Thailand

•       To issue recommendations for social provisions in line with international standards.

•       To provide lessons learned from other FTAs, including European Integration and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as well as integrate inputs from investors and social groups

Target groups for the study are

•         Ministry of Interior

•          Ministry of Foreign Affairs

•          Interested Parties (investors, land owners, social groups etc.)

The research project will:

1)      Examine AFTA side effects, notably land rights and land use

2)      Help plan social / legal policy

3)      Provide opportunities for external inputs  (investors, land owners etc.)

What you can do?

Support the study with your ideas on

• how the liberalization of the respective land rights should be done for Thailand and the other ASEAN countries
• what are your experiences referring to land use and FDI in Thailand and other ASEAN countries related to major obstacles and / or benefits
• share your opinion/information with us

Contact for further inquiry:

Dr. Wilfried A. Herrmann ( herrmann@hdff.or.th) or Mr. Thomas Collein (collein@hdff.or.th )

We need your input and ideas !!

E-Magazine Vol. 4

July 7, 2010 | By MN | Category: Research & Security Studies

Click the picture to read our E-Magazine Vol. 4

About Decentralization study trip to South Tyrol/Italy 7-15 June 2008

ASEAN- Civil Military Dialogue, Bangkok, June 27th- 30th

June 9, 2010 | By Research Manager | Category: Research & Security Studies

ASEAN Defence Establishments and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Cooperation on Non-Traditional Security

an international conference on disaster management co-hosted by Asian Disaster and Preparedness Center, Human Development Forum Foundation, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam and the Republic of the Philippines

For detail information: http://www.adpc.net/CSO/

Background

1. With an ongoing situation in Haiti, we can clearly see that there is an urgent need for improvement of the coordination between the various Military Forces and the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) working on the ground. A lot of chaos and confusion could have been avoided if a proper framework of cooperation between Militaries and CSOs are in place. Unfortunately, this issue has often been neglected when it comes to discussion on disaster response and relief.

2. Recognising the importance of the cooperation between Defence Establishments and CSOs, ASEAN has taken the initial effort to look closely into this issue in the Southeast Asian region. The 1st Workshop on ‘ASEAN Defence Establishments and CSOs on Non-Traditional Security (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief)’, co-hosted by Thailand and Malaysia took place on the 8th and 9th of June 2009, at Plaza Athenee in Bangkok, Thailand with the main aim to address various issues which were and potentially could have been faced by the ASEAN Defence Establishments and the CSOs when it came to working together for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

3. Over 200 representatives from the military and the CSOs from the ASEAN Member States attended this workshop and several challenges and areas for improvement were identified during the two-day event. The participants also suggested strategies and analysis to tackle the various issues faced during Disaster Management and a report was prepared to acknowledge the need for further action to improve the cooperation between ASEAN defence establishments and CSOs.

Against this backdrop Human Development Forum Foundation is proud to announce the 2nd international conference: ASEAN Defence Establishments and Civil Society Organisations Cooperation on Non-Traditional Security, Bangkok, June 27th- 30th

Raising Awareness of Different Concepts of Autonomy in Thailand

June 3, 2010 | By Research Manager | Category: Research & Security Studies

From April 2008- September 2009, HDFF coordinated the Raising Awareness of Different Concepts of Autonomy in Thailand Program. This program was instigated by the internal conflict that has been present in the Southern Border Provinces of Thailand since 2001. The agenda mainly consisted of introducing new concepts and understandings of autonomy to the Royal Thai Government along with the general Thai public. Surveys were given to Thai citizens throughout Thailand regarding their opinion and understanding of autonomy and self-governance. The surveys exhibited that Thai society is not necessarily against autonomy within the Southern Border Provinces but against using the word “autonomy.”

Another crucial aspect of the program was a field trip to South Tyrol, Italy to provide a firsthand example of autonomy. The participants were distinctive members of the Royal Thai Government involved directly or indirectly within the Southern Border Provinces. The participants were presented with legal and scientific framework of autonomy in South Tyrol by various fieldtrips around the region. Also introduced were practical implementations of a multilingual education system, historical developments and the media. Once back in Thailand, the participants were able to put their findings and experiences into action within their professions.

Finally, several key points regarding autonomy were found in the research for the Royal Thai Government. The first step was assessing the causation of conflict. This is apparent in historical circumstances giving way to the makeup of Thailand that introduced mistrust and anger between Southern Thailand society and the Central Thailand authorities.  Another contributing factor to the conflict is that the Thai military and Thai Buddhist majority do not view the Muslims in the south as Thai nationals. Ultimately, a permanent solution can only be found in the equal treatment of the Muslim community by the rest of the Thai population.

HDFF’s Phuket Maritime Forum

December 21, 2009 | By Research Manager | Category: Research & Security Studies

The Human Development Forum Foundation (HDFF), based in Bangkok, Thailand is proud to announce its inaugural conference on maritime security entitled, “Phuket Maritime Forum” in January.

Phuket Maritime Forum will provide the perfect opportunity to attract Asian and global awareness to maritime security issues as well as new sustainable technologies. The event will be held at Royal Phuket Marina, a truly stunning area of natural beauty and modern design on the east coast of Phuket.

China/ Maritime Security:  An excellent piece from StratFor on Chinese activities in East Timor and beyond.

Sours: www.stratfor.com”Dispatch: Chinese Influence Expands in South Pacific”