Introduction

The Deep South of Thailand comprises the entirety of four different provinces, namely Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani and Satun, in addition to some parts of Songkhla. The population living in the region are predominantly Malay-Muslim and have a distinct cultural identity from the general Thai-Buddhist community. Instead of using a language from the Tai family, such as Central Thai and Southern Thai, they primarily use Patani Malay or Jawi, and instead of Buddhism, they adhere to the teachings of Islam. 

Due to this population’s cultural uniqueness, it has been a point of contention for governors of the past who pushed for nationalistic assimilation. Today, the region is characterized by political unrest due to a variety of factors, including the historic assimilationist policies that were implemented during Phibun Songkhram and Sarit Thanarat’s government and the rise of separationist movements, which have led the government to view religious activities in security terms rather than with the purpose of diversity promotion. These assimilationist policies have been viewed as a threat to the citizens’ cultural identity, and this has translated to educational challenges that have an ethnic and religious character. 

The policies, particularly the “Pondok Educational Improvement Reform” of 1961, led to the emergence of four different educational structures, which are Islamic private schools, government schools, traditional Islamic schools that prioritize Islamic studies (i.e., pondoks), and tadikas (Islamic primary schools). In the Deep South, government schools are attended by less than 30 percent of Muslim children, as most Muslim parents prefer Islamic private schools that combine secular education with Islamic studies, a method that is seen as better suited for those that want their children to learn about Islamic beliefs (Deep South Watch, 2024). Consequently, it is perceived as a better-contextualized form of education as opposed to government schools that only offer two hours of religious study.  

Due to the unique structure of the education system as mentioned above, this brings into question the current challenges that Islamic private schools and pondoks are facing with regard to how they balance academic success with religious fulfillment. 

The researcher acknowledges that there are citizens of other religions in the Deep South, and their needs should also be met to enhance social cohesion in the region; however, this paper discusses three particularly unique ethnic and religious challenges that are affecting the education system in the Malay-Muslim community due to their predominance in the region and their history of marginalization. These challenges are

1. The Lack of Religious Recognition in Policy Implementation and Teacher Instruction
2. The Combination of Islamic and Secular Studies
3. The Informal Education in the Deep South

Historical Background

Before the current challenges of Islamic institutions in the education system are discussed, it is essential to describe the historical background of the Deep South’s education system and how it came to be to better contextualize them. 

Historically, it was only in 1961 when the education system in the Deep South began its transformation, although government attempts to assimilate the citizens of the community preceded it, as made apparent when Phibun Songkhram introduced policies to make central Thai the official language of the government and schools and force educational institutions to teach lessons aligned with Buddhist values from the 1930s to the 1940s (Minority Rights, 2018).

Nevertheless, the “Pondok Educational Improvement Reform” initiative, implemented by Sarit Thanarat’s government in 1961, was the main driver of the transformation, as it asked for all pondoks to register with the government in exchange for financial aid with the extra caveat that they need to introduce secular subjects as recommended by the Ministry of Education (Assalihee et al., 2024). This turned them from pondoks into Islamic private schools. The initiative was seen as voluntary at the time, but in 1966, new pondoks were not allowed to be opened, and existing ones that did not register were deemed illegal (Polkla and Dubus, 2011). The Malay-Muslims of the Deep South perceived this as an undermining of their cultural and religious identity, and this fueled their distrust in the government. At the same time, the government viewed religious institutions as a means for separatist ideas to be disseminated, causing them to be seen with skepticism (UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regional Office, 2014). 

Consequently, the education system of the Deep South is underscored by tensions between the formal educational framework of the state and the religious and cultural values of the Malay-Muslim population, leading to policy gaps and ineffective pedagogical structures. 

Challenges 

The Lack of Religious Recognition in Policy Implementation and Teacher Instruction

One of the challenges the Malay-Muslim community in the Deep South is currently facing is the insufficient recognition of religion in policy implementation. Indeed, there are a limited number of policies and initiatives that position religion as the focal point without subsuming it under terms such as “culture” or using it broadly without reference to how it can contribute to the education system. 

One particular situation in which this is evident is in the context of the Area-Based Education (ABE) initiative in the province of Yala. The purpose of the ABE initiative is to increase the collaboration between different education-focused stakeholders in Yala to allow for the development of effective policies, allowing for contextualized education. Yet, in the report authored by the Equitable Education Fund (EEF) (2024), the term “culture” was used frequently while the term “religion” was completely absent. This can cause a limited focus to be placed on religion, which can be disadvantageous to the Malay-Muslim community, as religion is central to their identity. 

Another policy wherein this occurred is notably the report detailing the “Homegrown Teacher” policy that aims to develop teaching skills that match the context of different provinces (EEF, 2024). Although “religion” was mentioned in the report, it was used in a detached way with no reference to how it can play a part in the education system. Instead, more focus was placed on the linguistic dimension of “culture,” which has been the priority and focus of other policies and initiatives, such as the Patani Malay-Thai Multilingual Education initiative, which is an example of a program that was successful at accomplishing its aims but had likewise placed minimal focus on religion in implementation. 

The Patani Malay-Thai Multilingual Education (PMT-MLE) was intended to increase the region’s scores on the mandatory Thai national test (i.e., the Ordinary National Educational Test (O-NET)), and it was successful in this regard as it introduced the Patani Malay language, the native language of the community, into the public school system. However, the objectives and aims of the policy did not explicitly mention “religion,” although “culture” once again was employed frequently. In the main text, there was reference to religion, but nonetheless, it was not the focus of the initiative and not taken into consideration in the evaluation criteria (UNESCO, 2024). The success of the PMT-MLE also suggests that accommodating the linguistic dimension of culture is not the complete answer, as Islamic private schools remain popular.

These policies underscore the insufficient amount of religious recognition in educational policies in the Deep South. While decentralizing religion as a variable to be considered in the education system allows policymakers to avoid politically sensitive subjects, it also diminishes and obscures the importance of religion during the development of educational policies and initiatives. 

This has contributed to the lack of participation by religious community leaders in the designing and implementation of educational policies and the overlooking of the importance of teacher training initiatives that fit the context of Islam. Implicit references to religion only serve to push it away from the consideration of education bodies (Pukaew et al., 2025). As such, acknowledging religion as a significant variable would allow policies to become more effective at balancing religious study with academic study and successfully address policy gaps left by the PMT-MLE and similar policies. 

The Combination of Islamic and Secular Studies

Another challenge private Islamic schools are experiencing pertains to the combination of the Basic Education Core Curriculum of the state with the Islamic Studies Curriculum (Lateh et al., 2025). The purpose of this union is to allow students to develop both an understanding of Islamic theology along with secular knowledge such as English, math, and the sciences. Most Islamic private schools teach the national curriculum in the morning and Islamic studies in the afternoon. As a result, this brings into question the sufficiency of the teachings for the development of the knowledge of the student in both the secular and religious fields. 

There are reports that suggest that this system leads to a lower number of secular and religious courses that are taught each week, with examples particularly in the context of English study. In an investigation wherein English teachers from two of the schools in each province are interviewed to better understand the limitations of English education in the Deep South, it was found that schools have difficulty teaching a sufficient number of English courses, as time must be allocated to religious studies. In one interview, the teacher mentioned that private Islamic schools can only teach three English courses per week as opposed to the five lessons per week required by the Ministry of Education, emphasizing the challenges present with regard to the curriculum (Assalihee and Boonsuk, 2022). 

In a broader perspective, research in Pattani has shown that in some Islamic private schools, religion is the main focus, with secular subjects being added to meet policy requirements, underscoring the limited attention paid to secular education (Chuap, 2025). This is compounded by the results of a quantitative study in which 390 teachers from Islamic private schools in Pattani province took part. In the study, the primary challenge the teachers agreed on was the curriculum (Chewae and Wa-useng, 2018). 

One of the possible remedies to this has been discussed frequently in literature: the Islamization of secular education. In the context of English lessons, teachers have agreed that incorporating Islamic topics into the lessons can increase engagement and allow students to “appreciate the religion and the language at the same time.” The Islamization of secular education has also been done in some Islamic private schools, with them adopting a merged time-curricular structure that incorporates Islamic values into secular education; however, there are still challenges that these schools need to overcome to effectively adopt the education, namely the lack of teacher coaching, lack of resources, and lack of principal involvement, among other factors (Lateh et al., 2025; Assalihee et al., 2018). 

As such, future policies and initiatives that focus on the combination of secular education with Islamic values would allow for the balance of the community’s religious needs and secular academic success. It must, however, be noted that further Islamization of the education system can yield discourse regarding social cohesion and intercultural acceptance. This is a separate element of the education system that policymakers should take into account, transforming this into a multi-variable challenge that depends on the balance between religious fulfillment, cultural acceptance, and academic success. 

The Informal Education in the Deep South

The final ethnic and religious challenge this paper discusses is one that, if addressed, can support the current “Zero Drop Out” policy that aims to reintegrate out-of-school students back into the formal education system. This is because of the informal education system in the Deep South that is made up of unregistered pondoks.

Although many pondoks decided to register with the Ministry of Education and begin their transformation into Islamic private schools due to policies implemented in the 1960s, some pondoks today choose to remain unregistered due to their distrust for the government and their concern that they would be forced into adopting a non-Malay educational framework that would undermine their identity. Meanwhile, other pondoks were unable to meet the requirements of the Ministry of Education and thus were not able to register. 

These pondoks are unaccounted for in official data due to their unregistered status (the U.S. Department of State, 2012), making it challenging to find the precise number, although a report by Ladaphongphatthana et al. (2025) suggests that there are an estimated 125, 35,37 and 12 unregistered pondoks in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun respectively, as of January 2025. 

Students who enroll in these pondoks experience difficulty in pursuing higher education, as they operate outside the formal educational framework. As such, designing policies and initiatives to allow for these students to enter the formal education framework would meet the needs of the Malay-Muslim community, but it needs to be done with sensitivity. 

Some of these pondoks are wary of government interference due to rumors of government policies that involved the abduction and murder of Tok Gurus (teachers of Islam) who were suspected of teaching separatist views after the 2004 resurgence in the South and the prevailing view that adopting the curriculum of the national secular education would diminish the Malay-Muslim identity (Liow, 2004).

As a result, policies and initiatives should focus less on surveillance and government registration and more on providing students already in the system alternate pathways to higher education. This approach would reduce the tension between the community and the state while enabling the prioritization of formal education. Although mandating all unregistered pondoks to register with the government would allow for access to students that can benefit from the “Zero Drop Out” policy, it also has the capacity to fuel further distrust. Consequently, it is best to approach the challenge with policies that do not undermine the pondoks’ autonomy but still allow for the highest level of benefit to the students. 

Conclusion

Ultimately, the aforementioned ethnic and religious challenges that are currently influencing Islamic educational institutions in the Deep South can be remedied with the recognition of the religious differences between Malay-Muslims and Thai-Buddhists and an understanding of Thailand’s historic policies. By addressing these unique challenges, rooted in religion and history, with sensitivity, the education system would become more inclusive, allowing Malay-Muslims to fulfill their religious obligations while developing their knowledge with secular education.

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