Human Development Forum Foundation
By Héloïse Le Guellec*
“Do not test the patience and the limits of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). We will never hesitate to use the full powers of the COMELEC under the Constitution, just to ensure that no lives are sacrificed and everyone can vote,” stated the COMELEC chairperson G. E. Garcia during an interview on June 3, in Manila [1]. He also reminded everyone that anyone thinking of disrupting the smooth running of the elections would have to face serious legal consequences. He stressed that the impartial implementation of the Bangsamoro Electoral Code (BEC) should be observed to reaffirm the non-occurrence of common election irregularities such as vote buying, violence, and terrorism, among others.
BARMM transition government mobilizes for democratic process ahead of elections
In the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), recent developments paint a diverse picture of its political, social, and economic landscape. The Commission on Elections extended the deadline for political party accreditation for the upcoming parliamentary elections to June 30th, underscoring initial challenges in regional political organization. Amid political tensions, rumors of a coup were dispelled, maintaining stability despite past precedents. Meanwhile, infrastructure upgrades at Northern Mindanao airports signify regional development efforts, supporting logistical and security needs. Commitments to peace and progress were reiterated in meetings between BARMM officials and local leaders, focusing on addressing historical injustices and economic disparities. Efforts in youth empowerment and combatting child labor underscore ongoing challenges in social integration and development.
Concurrently, protests on Health Workers’ Day highlighted demands for better pay and benefits, reflecting ongoing concerns in the healthcare sector. Displaced residents of Marawi staged protests over property valuations, illustrating lingering grievances post-conflict [2]. The appointment of a former Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Shari’ah court chief as BARMM’s new ceremonial head emphasized continuity in Islamic governance.
Even if organized crime is decreasing, the region is still affected by persistent clan feuds and targeted attacks on Officials
The first half of 2024 witnessed growing intensity, particularly regarding the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)-Karialan branch of the BIFF, an armed group formed in 2010 after political divergences with the MILF. The death of the group’s leader, Kagui Karialan, marked a shift in the local power dynamics. In the two months following his death, the intensity of the conflicts that had flared up since the beginning of the year eased. The effort among the authorities continues to eradicate terrorism in the region. Operations against militant groups like the BIFF led to clashes resulting in casualties, including the death of a BIFF militant and the confiscation of explosives. Violent acts have become increasingly scattered and Maguindanao del Sur has particularly seen disorganized attacks on Barangays’ [3] representatives, councilors, and chiefs increase, with eight attacks in the last two months, including the killing of a barangay treasurer and his daughter in Cotabato City. Moreover, rido conflicts and political disputes over land escalated tensions between clans affiliated with the (MILF) in Maguindanao del Sur. A longstanding rido between the Latip and Mustapa clans in Akbar, Basilan, escalated with fatal consequences, involving gun attacks and clashes between clan members.
Finally, two explosions were registered during the last two months. One is likely to be related to the extortion of a gas station owner, who received a letter a week before. The explosion happened as authorities announced the island was freed from Abu-Sayaf earlier that day. The other explosion was caused by a grenade in a Cotabato City’s church, causing no fatalities. These events illustrate a complex security landscape intertwining clan conflicts, terrorism, political violence, and efforts toward local peacebuilding in the region.
What to expect: Most of BARMM’s provinces are going through a significant decrease in the number of incidents. However, Maguindanao del Sur and Basilan are still more likely to be affected by conflicts rooted in time that are not resolved. The period following the assassination of a political and/or religious leader is always a period of turmoil, resulting in a breakdown of the forces involved and discussions about who should take over the leadership of the group.
While China continues to escalate its aggression, the Marcos Administration and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are mired in a state of strategic limbo and continue to make half-hearted statements.
China-Philippines diplomatic relations keep decreasing as incidents in the West Philippine Sea are multiplying and getting more intense. China has been revindicating an extended Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), known as the nine-dash line. China has also been transforming reefs in the Spratly into artificial islands. However, a 2016 arbitral ruling in The Hague favored the Philippines, stating that the Chinese claims had no legal basis in international law [4]. Over the last two months, four significant incidents around the Second Thomas Shoal – also called Ayungin Shoal – happened. In this context, China’s scare tactics and expansion ambitions are more likely to turn into a dead-end situation:
On May 19th, 2024, two incidents occurred including a laser, water canon, and the theft of a bag of food during the Rotation and Resupply (RoRe) mission. China is accused of stealing and dumping goods such as food and materials overboard, and to hinder the medical evacuations of PH soldiers who had to get evacuated from the BRP Sierra Madre. PH force suspected that the Chinese were expecting to find construction material in the bag they stole.
On May 24th, 2024, China surrounded a group of Filipino fishermen and attacked them with a water canon.
On June 17th, 2024, China took a step up in terms of intensity by using knives and axes on Filipino rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIB), directly pointing to Filipino boats. This altercation eventually ended up with a Filipino coast guard losing a finger.
In terms of law
Those events are occurring at a time when China strengthened its revendication on the disputed islets. Chinese Coast Guards launched their “no trespassing” policy to legitimize their violent actions. This new regulation gives them the legal power to detain foreigners trespassing in their revindicated water without trial. In terms of capacity building, this policy also explains why the number of deployed ships in the area drastically increased with both regular CSC ships as well as Chinese maritime military (CMM) ships – 108 CMM vessels were observed from June 4th to June 10th.
Governments and international community reaction
Chinese “No trespassing” policy has been talked about during the 2024 G7 Summit held in Italy. Countries reaffirmed the concept of freedom of navigation on high seas [5], the 2016 arbitral ruling, and strongly condemned China’s obstruction. From ASEAN’s point of view, this situation also represents a dangerous escalation. Besides calling for the establishment of joint patrols with other ASEAN countries that have claims in the Spratleys, the regional cooperation organization is also working on the implementation of a Code of Conduct.
Héloïse Le Guellec is a Project Officer at HDFF.
[3] A Barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines
[4] On July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal adjudicating the Philippines’ case against China in the South China Sea ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines, determining that major elements of China’s claim—including its nine-dash line, recent land reclamation activities, and other activities in Philippine waters—were unlawful. https://www.uscc.gov/research/south-china-sea-arbitration-ruling-what-happened-and-whats-next
[5] Article 87 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
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