Shan State has experienced conflict and instability for many years, with various ethnic armed groups fighting for control and independence. Groups like the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army North (SSPP/SSA-N) have long been fighting over land in Shan State. Recently, internal divisions, external influences, and changing peace efforts have made it more difficult to achieve Shan unity. Since the Myanmar government’s power weakened after 2021, groups such as the Kokang and Wa have taken control of larger areas, forming the Three Brotherhood Alliance. These groups often work together but also compete with each other, leading to clashes and ongoing instability. Many of these conflicts are fueled by ethnic pride, land disputes, and the money earned from the drug trade. Overall, the situation remains unstable and uncertain, as ethnic groups continue fighting to defend their land and interests.
Shan Political Landscape
Shan State has a complex political situation, with both military and political groups playing important roles. The two main military groups are the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), which was founded in 1964 and is currently led by Chairman General Sao Pang Fa. The other is the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), founded in 1996 by General Yawd Serk. Each group has its own army and controls different areas. On the political side, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) was founded in 1988 by Khun Tun Oo, now led by Sai Nyunt Lwin and the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) was established in 2010 by Sai Aik Pao. These political parties represent the Shan people in elections. While the military groups focus on armed struggle and control territory, the political parties work through election and government systems. Before the 2021 military coup, Shan ethnic armed groups such as RCSS and SSPP were engaged in internal conflict, particularly over territorial control in Shan State. In 2020 and 2021, intense clashes between the two groups displaced thousands of civilians and weakened Shan unity. The situation became more complex after the coup, as national instability and growing resistance to the military junta reshaped alliances and military strategies. Although the two groups signed a ceasefire in late 2023, tensions remain due to the growing presence of the Three Brotherhood Alliance in Shan-majority areas and ongoing conflicts between ethnic armed groups.
Relations With Government and EAO
Shan Ethnic Armed Groups (EAO) in Myanmar have a complex relationship with the government, characterized by periods of conflict, ceasefire agreements and a peace negotiation. As part of a peace process, the Restoration Council of Shan State signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015. Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) did not sign the NCA, but joined with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) through the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), founded in 2017. FPNCC is an alliance of seven ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) including the Arakan Army (AA), United Wa State Army (UWSA), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). These groups are mostly based in Northern Myanmar and have taken stronger positions against the military regime, especially during Operation 1027, which launched in October 2023. Although SSPP is part of this alliance, it has remained largely silent and inactive during the ongoing resistance movement in Northern Shan State. This lack of action, along with past clashes between SSPP and RCSS, shows the deep internal divisions among Shan groups. While other EAOs like the AA, KIA, and TNLA, are actively fighting the military, the two main Shan EAOs have not played a leading role, raising doubts about their unity and commitment to liberating Shan State.
Source: Wikimedia commons
Internal Conflict Among Shan Ethnic Armed Group
The internal conflict between RCSS and SSPP has been ongoing for many years, rooted in territorial disputes and political differences. The RCSS signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the Myanmar government in October 2015, making itself an important part of peace process. On the other hand, the SSPP did not sign the NCA and instead maintained strong relations with other ethnic armed organizations (UWSA, TNLA), forming alliances outside the official peace framework. Tensions escalated after 2016, with repeated clashes breaking out, especially in Northern Shan State. By late 2020 and early 2021, the fighting became more intense, and the RCSS was forced to leave Northern Shan State after being attacked by the combined forces of the SSPP, TNLA, and possibly the UWSA. Despite several meetings aimed at promoting unity and ending hostilities such as talks in 2018 and 2019, in addition to the ceasefire agreement signed on November 29, 2023, violent clashes between the two Shan groups have continued. This persistent conflict reflects deeper divisions within the Shan political and military landscape, even as both groups claim to work toward Shan unity and self-determination.
Regional and International Influences
Shan ethnic armed groups are strongly shaped by regional and international actors, particularly China, which plays a key role in influencing conflict dynamics in Shan State. China plays a key role in shaping the conflict in Shan State, as it has close relationships with several powerful ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), particularly the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). These groups receive weapons and political support from China, although the Chinese government officially denies this. China’s influence is strongest with the UWSA and MNDAA but it also reaches other groups like the SSPP through trade and border connections. In 2021, the SSPP, UWSA, and TNLA, which all have ties to China, worked together to push the RCSS out of Northern Shan State. This action aligned with China’s interests in maintaining control and stability near its border. Later, in 2023, the MNDAA, TNLA, and AA launched a major offensive called Operation 1027, capturing around 20 towns from the Myanmar military in northern Shan State. After this success, China became more active in trying to stop the fighting. It pressured the EAOs to agree to ceasefires and pushed for peace talks with the military regime. It aimed to protect Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Myanmar, including pipelines and trade routes that run through conflict zones. Its strategic interests, especially in securing these routes, have led China to support the stability of the military regime, but its approach often excludes the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), raising concerns about the long-term effectiveness of its influence.
Different Political Views and Alliances
The SSPP (Shan State Progress Party) and RCSS (Restoration Council of Shan State) hold different political views and alliances, which make cooperation difficult. SSPP often works more closely with other ethnic armed groups and has strong connections with northern alliances like the UWSA and the TNLA. These relationships help SSPP strengthen its position and influence in Shan State and beyond. It tends to support a more independent approach, focusing on protecting Shan interests and resisting central government authority. In contrast, RCSS has tried to work out peace negotiations with the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, and sometimes follows a different, more diplomatic path, seeking integration or limited autonomy within the existing government system. This difference in strategy reflects deeper ideological divides, which can lead to fractured alliances and occasional conflicts among Shan armed groups.
Challenges for Shan Unity
The competition between the two main Shan ethnic armed groups the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) has undermined attempts at Shan unity for years. Although both groups agreed to a ceasefire during a meeting on November 29, 2023, encouraged by Shan monks and public calls for peace, fighting resumed within months. The conflict is further complicated by overlapping territorial claims and pressures from external forces, especially in Northern Shan State, where RCSS presence since 2015 has led to clashes with SSPP, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the United Wa State Army (UWSA). In 2021, RCSS was forced out of some areas, with China supporting this move to stabilize its border and protect trade interests. In the meantime, other armed groups like MNDAA have attacked SSPP positions, likely motivated by territorial and economic goals. Despite these ongoing challenges and divisions, the Shan/Tai people continue to hope that their armed groups can unite to protect their communities and contribute meaningfully to the struggle for a federal democratic future.
Sources
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/making-sense-of-the-mess-in-myanmars-shan-state.html
https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/04/02/8601
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/decoding-china-s-multi-stakeholder-strategy-in-myanmar
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/china-pushing-myanmar-ethnic-armies-to-halt-offensives-along-bri-sources.htmlhttps://english.shannews.org/archives/26893
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