On Tuesday the 6th of February, an HDFF team attended a talk organized by the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) at Chulalongkorn University on the subject of “Entering the Fourth Year of the Myanmar Crisis: A Road to Peace or Disintegration ?”.
The Myanmar Armed Forces (also known as Tatmadaw) are presumed to be losing the war with the various resistant groups (People’s Defense Forces, Ethnic Armed Organizations, and other resistant formations). As the fourth year since the coup commenced, analysts and scholars looked into the history of the conflict, the role of international actors (specifically regional actors and the ASEAN), the military reality on the ground, the possible unfolding of the crisis as well as the opportunities and issues bound to occur as the military will be removed from power. As such, the discussion was moderated by MS Gwen Robinson a Senior Fellow at ISIS Thailand, former president of Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand and the Editor-at-Large at Nikkei Asian Review and saw the interventions of Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, professor in the department of International Relations as well as a senior fellow at ISIS Thailand, Chulalongkorn University; Dr. Lalita H. Hanwong Assistant Professor at the Department of History and Faculty of Social Science at Kasetsart University; Dr. Matthew Arnold, Academic and Independent Policy Analyst and Former Asia Foundation Representative and Mr. Nyantha Maw Lin an Independent Analyst.
The 2021 Coup until Today: an overview of the situation.
Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak started the talk by doing a quick overview of the situation since the 2021 coup. He explained how surprising it still is for some administrations to concede the fact that even though the coup succeeded in its execution, the Myanmar armed forces have failed to implement it. The civil disobedience movement turned civil war has in the last four years become an exception in the eyes of many to the infallibility of a coup and of the military in Myanmar.
By 2022, the civil war had intensified with the historical Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO) now joined by resistance groups and the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), supported by the National Unity Government (NUG). Those different resistant groups became well organized and equipped. Although not a single and united entity, they have been able to take over territory and actively fight against the junta throughout the country. All experts agree that today, the resistance holds the upper hand. The Myanmar Armed Forces were used to fighting against the diverse EAOs since independence, however, this conflict strikes as novel as the junta forces must now fight against groups composed of Bamar people. The whole country is fighting against the junta forces and the habitual use of the Bamar identity and religion to rally the majority is not effective anymore. It is the first time in the history of the country that the military has been so weak, with an accrued number of desertions and an overall and overwhelming lack of support from all inhabitants of the country.
Dr. Lalita Hawong argued that the recent joint statement issued by the NUG, the Chin National Front, the Karen National Union, and the Karenni National Progressive Party brings about dynamics of alliances amongst resistance groups. However, as always, major resistance groups are missing such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Arakan Army (AA), the New Mon State Party and its armed forces (MNLA), and the Shan State. Mr. Nyantha Maw Lin later responded that even though not all major resistance groups signed the statement they are certainly testing the waters with the NUG and are not to be misunderstood as unwilling to participate in the creation of the country post-junta.
Because of the historical context, trust needs to be built between the NUG and Ethnic Armed Organizations; it is more than understandable that Ethnic Armies remain on the fence regarding the NUG and its Bamar leaders.
The role of International Actors, where do Thailand and ASEAN stand?
Right after the coup, the International Community, namely the US, the EU, and Japan expressed their opposition. ASEAN on the other hand got divided on the question with Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia pushing for a return to the democratic process and the rest of the group failing to do so. ASEAN was immediately considered by the international community as the prime facilitator in this conflict and the association agreed to the five points consensus in April 2021, an agreement that has failed to show any results in its peacekeeping agenda.
Cambodia was the head of ASEAN in 2022 and assuming his position, Hun Sen, the then prime minister of Cambodia, put it upon himself to meet the junta chief but the talk did not amount to anything significant. ASEAN is still divided, but the undeniable and upcoming loss of the armed forces of Myanmar is a turnin point for the organization to become an active player in the upcoming unfolding of the situation. As Myanmar has sent one official (although a non-political one) to the ASEAN late January meeting for the first time in two years, all experts agree that ASEAN should capitalize on this move and look into working with the NUG and the main EAOs; to truly become a facilitator, if not in the resolution of the crisis; then in its aftermath. Thailand holds a unique position per the length of the shared borders and the economic and social links between the two countries: from refugees, legal and illegal workers (2 to 3 million in each category), and the close links between the former government and the junta.
It was argued by Dr. Lalita H.Hawong that Thailand needs to be braver and take into consideration its position and specificities so as not to anger the Myanmar nationals on its territory. In this light, Thailand has opened a humanitarian corridor. However, it did so without taking into consideration nor consulting Ethnic Armed Groups or the Myanmar nationals present in places such as Mae Sot, Chiang Mai, or Bangkok. Thailand’s new government and the foreign ministry have now shifted their position on Myanmar and are standing on the side of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines.
Another regional actor, China, acted as a mediator in the recent January ceasefire agreement between northern resistance groups and the Myanmar Armed Forces (though unsuccessful). Finally, Bangladesh holds a unique position due to the issue of Rohingya refugees on its territory. The eventual resolution of the conflict and the advent of peace could bring about repatriation for the close to one million Rohingya refugees in the country.
Military Progressions: innovation and the impressive territory gain of the resistance.
Next, Dr. Matthew Arnold focused on the military advancements and evolution of the battles between the Myanmar Armed Forces and the resistant groups.
When the coup took place in 2021 questions focused on whether there would be resistance. As the Civil disobedience movement was met with appalling violence from the junta, the resistance organized itself, increased its number, and heightened its fighting capacities. 2022 saw a greater increase in armed resistance and even before the 1027 operation since October 2023, resistance groups were already taking over townships and rural areas from the military. This national uprising has been particularly hard to repress for the military as it comes from all parts of the country, including the Bamar heartland. Since October 2023 distinctly, this unconventional war has taken a turn for the worse for the citizens. As the Myanmar Armed Forces are losing more and more territory, they have increased the level and amount of violence against citizens: with a greater number of raids, artillery strikes, and airstrikes.
The war has also become increasingly urban with more than 50% of the fighting happening in urban areas. This is another evidence of the Myanmar Armed Forces losing momentum as it is being pushed back into defensive areas. The military has also been losing important towns and control of roads which leaves it more fragmented and thus less powerful. As the armed forces are being forced into their historic center, they are now met with resistance coming from their previously loyal core, having to fight everyone, everywhere, all at once with fewer soldiers and a fragmented military force.
It is now evident that the junta is losing the war as they have not been able to mount a proper offensive since the 1027 operation. As a number of soldiers have been fleeing to China and Bangladesh, the military cannot keep control over territory they cannot protect.
The resistance groups have been showing an impressive amount of renewed political solidarity despite their own separate revendications. They have been able to take on a remarkable feat and have created a bottom-up revolution that is soon to be successful.
On that note, pragmatism is necessary for the future, but it remains quite ambiguous as to what could come next.
Nation-Building, Trust, and Symbolism
Mr. Nyantha Maw Lin argued that the military, the root cause of all the problems in the country and whose legacy of authoritarianism, systematic use of violence, and mismanagement resulting in resistance and revolution; has never tried to construct a true state, let alone a nation. The “state” that the junta is governing has never been fully functioning nor considered as such by the Myanmar people.
Regarding the political format to be established in the country: all experts mentioned that a federal democratic union was the only one considered by the various leaders. Questions remain: What will the states look like and how will they be operated? Regarding these issues, experts agree that openness, flexibility, and a certain trust in the resistance groups are needed. Ethnic Resistance Groups have in some regions already established administrations, schooling systems, and more. Taking their accomplishments into consideration will be essential for a peaceful transition and establishment of the state.
The NUG is believed to play the role of the transitional central government before the new establishment of a federal democratic union. A national armed force is still needed, only it cannot be the Tatmadaw who caused too many atrocities to be regarded as legitimate.
In the next building phase, newly created trust between the ethnic resistance actors and the NUG (a Bamar-dominant institution) will be essential. Sufficient credit should be given to the resistance as it is only through the national efforts of many (ethnic armies, citizens…) that the way forward can be built and a peaceful resolution can be found. The country must turn its back on the Bamar chauvinism it has been accustomed to and use another basis for national identity. It must stay away from the use of identity politics and consequent weaponizing of race and religion that has been the norm and resulted in grievances. Justice is also needed for all those who have been on the receiving end of the systematic discrimination and violence of the Myanmar Armed Forces.
Moreover, the argument was made that ASEAN should put pressure on the junta to release Aung San Suu Kyi. Although she may not anymore be able to be a political leader, her unique position as a symbol of resistance and democracy could help build the unity of the country.
Finally, all the analysts remain overall optimistic as to the unfolding of the situation. Without denying the atrocities, the complexities of the coming debates, decisions, and nation-building creation; they all agree that the Junta is losing, and a new path is bound to open for Myanmar.