by The Foundation HDFF
on July 24, 2025

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ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, was established on August 8, 1967, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The organization aimed to foster economic growth, promote peace and security, and encourage cooperation among Southeast Asian nations. Over time, ASEAN expanded to include Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia, making up the ten current member states. 

As set out in the ASEAN Declaration, the purpose of ASEAN is to “accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership (…), promote regional peace and stability (…), promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields (…)” (Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation). Hence, member states adopted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1976 and agreed on a shared ASEAN Vision 2020 in 1997, before resolving in 2003 that an ASEAN Community should be established by 2015. This Community, comprised of three pillars, namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, features strategic frameworks and roadmaps, testifying to the willingness of ASEAN countries to enhance cooperation and promote a regional vision.

However, while ASEAN opened the way for Southeast Asian multilateralism in the early 1990s and 2000s by attempting to gather countries under a united front, in times of crises, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the need for smaller, more interest-focused groups seemed evident. Minilateralism, defined by Miles Kahler as “informal groups, composed of a small number of states to ease impediments to cooperation” (Kahler, 1992) and popularized by Moises Naim’s referral to an “excellent and more tailored way of grouping the least number of states” (Naim, 2009) thus grew more prominent. Over the past two decades and in the face of new challenges, such as the US-China rivalry, climate change, and digitalization, minilateralism has gained momentum and now appears the preferred choice in the Indo-Pacific. While the ASEAN Declaration acknowledges one of its purposes is maintaining “close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves” (Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation), what does that entail for ASEAN? How do minilaterals fit into the three pillars of the ASEAN Community?

The ASEAN Community: a shared pathway towards regional integration

Established in 2015, the ASEAN Community is “a community with enhanced capacity and capabilities to both respond effectively to challenges and seize opportunities it encapsulates”, highlighting “how far and well the ASEAN Member States have come together as one Community” (ASEAN, ASEAN Community Fact Sheet, 1). Building on existing frameworks, the ASEAN Community is built upon three pillars: the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community to promote a shared future through “one vision, one identity, one community”.

The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) aims at ensuring “a rules-based and inclusive community in which [the ASEAN] peoples enjoy human rights, fundamental freedoms and social justice, (….) in a dynamic region where ASEAN enhances its Centrality in the evolving regional architecture and plays a constructive role globally” (ASEAN, ASEAN Community Fact Sheet, 2). The ASPC is thus the key instrument in promoting peace and stability in the region through a rules-based approach to regional issues, thanks to treaties such as the ASEAN Charter, the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia or the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (ASEAN All).

The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 2025 envisions the region as a “highly integrated and cohesive economy, (…) fostering a competitive, innovative and dynamic ASEAN with enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation, by remaining resilient, inclusive, people-oriented and becoming a global ASEAN” (ASEAN, ASEAN Community Fact Sheet, 2). By allowing free flows of goods, services, and investment, strengthening regional supply chains, and constantly adapting to challenges such as digitalization, the AEC allows greater economic interconnectedness and competitiveness.

Finally, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) aims to help ASEAN citizens realizing their potential “through cooperative initiatives that are people-oriented and people centered”, targeting “human development, sustainable development, and an ASEAN identity through inter cultural understanding and mutual respect” (ASEAN, ASEAN Community Fact Sheet, 3). Its actions cover areas such as information and media, education, health, social welfare, rights of women and children, rural development and poverty eradication, and health, to enhance the well-being of the people in the region. Concrete examples include HIV/AIDS treatment programs, or a network of 17 universities in ASEAN Member States. Disaster Risk Management (DRM) in ASEAN also primarily falls under the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) pillar. Specifically, the ASCC’s Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (DMHA) division is responsible for managing ASEAN’s cooperation in disaster management (ASEAN). 

Minilateralism: A Challenge to the ASEAN Community’s three pillars

While ASEAN prides itself on being the central hub for regional diplomacy through mechanisms like the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, and ADMM-Plus, minilaterals can sideline these platforms and undermine their centrality. The APSC is perceived to be especially at risk with examples such as the Quad (US-Japan-India-Australia) or the US-Philippines-Japan Trilateral engaging in Indo-Pacific security without ASEAN involvement, reducing the latter’s influence on regional security norms. Such dynamic smaller-scale organizations dilute ASEAN’s traditional role as the “driver’s seat” in regional architecture.

This undermined regional leadership creates a risk of fragmentation within the institutional landscape in the Indo-Pacific (Chong 2024) and especially ASEAN, hence exacerbating a variable geometry risks logic. In fact, minilateral groupings often rely on a logic of ad hoc and exclusivity, involving only certain ASEAN members (usually the more capable or like-minded ones to gain efficiency and facilitate consensus) thus exacerbating power asymmetries through discrimination as emphasized by Fulvio Attinà (Attinà 2007). Challenging all three pillars of the ASEAN Community, this dynamic erodes the “community” ideal by promoting exclusive cooperation and uneven development.

Thirdly, minilaterals can be perceived as bypassing ASEAN norms and consensus culture. While ASEAN indeed operates on the principles of non-interference, consensus decision-making (H.R. Villanueva, G. Manalo 2017) and quiet diplomacy, minilaterals encourage action-oriented mechanisms, less bound by consensus or non-interference and are willing to take stronger stances, even against ASEAN norms. After the Myanmar military coup in 2021, failure from ASEAN to take concrete action led Thailand to “conduct talks with Myanmar’s military regime under the guise of humanitarian engagement” in 2023 (Lowy Institute, The Interpreter 2025) and informal consultations attended by the Foreign Ministers of Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore to take stronger stances than those allowed by ASEAN’s cautious, consensus-based process. One could wonder whether such initiatives could threaten ASEAN’s normative foundation and solidarity, the latter seen as too passive.

Eventually, a frequent critique of minilaterals in Asia is that of involving major external powers (like the US, Japan, China, or Australia), hence creating a risk of promoting agendas which do not align with ASEAN priorities and rather heighten external competition. The presence of arguably competing Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), considered a vehicle for Chinese influence (Mingjiang, Xue 2024), and US-led Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), for instance raises concern over major powers encouraging minilaterals for their own geopolitical interests (Chheang 2020). In this regard, one could worry ASEAN’s goal of being neutral and balanced gets tested, and its unity strained when members take sides. This would especially question the relevance of the ASPC, should the latter be unable to contain political pressure and internal divisions.

Minilaterals: An Opportunity to Complement the ASEAN Community

Minilaterals can however be understood as facilitating proactive cooperation among ASEAN members and sharing expertise on key topics seen as too niche to mobilize the entirety of the ASEAN Community.

Regarding the ASEAN Political Security Community, minilaterals can improve regional security by facilitating cooperation on specific security challenges that may not be adequately addressed within the broader ASEAN framework, usually focusing on maritime security, counterterrorism and defense cooperation. This is for instance testified to by the creation of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas Patrols (SSSP) to confront the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) abductions amid growing concern about piracy and abductions in the context of Indonesia and Malaysia’s rejection of security proposals from non-ASEAN countries (Huang, 2008; Raymond, 2009 in N. Gallos 2023) and failure from ASEAN to provide a definite apparatus to deal with incidents in said areas (Beckman 2022).

Due to hardships in addressing widespread international and local fear of the ASG and piracy problems, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines launched the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas Patrols on 19 June 2017, strongly inspired by the Malacca Strait Patrols (Quilop, 2018; Storey, 2018 in N. Gallos 2023). Due to general condemnation and ASEAN pressure since such presence threatened the stability of countries’ economies and local populations (Dabova, 2013), the three countries decided to take matters into their own hands, reducing the abduction rate from 10 to no more than three incidents per year as compared to 2016 (N. Gallos 2023, 2). Yet, in doing so they followed the ‘inclusive, open, and nonconstraining” ASEAN way, leaving the door open to ASEAN states who would want to participate and held the principles of non-interference and consensus, drawing inspiration of ASEAN practice (Ramcharan, 2000 in N. Gallos 2023). Such initiative strengthened ASEAN’s role in maintaining regional stability and security by addressing specific threats, allowing more decisive action among willing members and promoting practical cooperation. 

Within the ASEAN Economic Community, minilaterals can likewise improve regional economic integration by focusing on specific sectors or sub-regions, leading to deeper economic cooperation and serving as building blocks for broader ASEAN economic integration. The 1994 BIMP-EAGA (Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area) initiative for instance focuses on “boosting growth in trade, investments, and tourism through new intra-region shipping routes, air links and power interconnection projects” to accelerate socio-economic development of less developed, marginalized and geographically remote areas in these four countries as broader goal to narrow development gaps (BIMP-EAGA 2024, 2). Through sub-regional economic cooperation, BIMP-EAGA contributed to the ASEAN Economic Community through regional integration and development, hence improving the region’s overall economic competitiveness. Moreover, bilateral or small-scale Free Trade Agreements (FTA), such as the 2000 deal signed between Singapore and New Zealand which allowed the former to become the latter’s largest trading partner in the Southeast Asia region, can serve as a template for broader ASEAN adoption (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade).

Regarding the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, minilaterals can foster people-to-people connectivity and address specific socio-cultural issues through targeted programs and initiatives. Collaborations on education, health, or cultural exchange can for instance be enhanced through such arrangements. By promoting deeper understanding, closer ties, and addressing specific regional needs, innovation, flexibility and efficiency are encouraged. One could again cite the BIMP-EAGA, organized around five fundamental strategic pillars: connectivity, food production, tourism, environmental conservation, and socio-cultural education (Kyeung Gu, Ratih Indraswari 2024), which actively works to “preserve and sustain BIMP-EAGA culture and heritage through socio-cultural events” and pursue “multi-sectoral consultation and collaboration (…) to produce knowledge products and services, such as training and research” (BIMP-EAGA). Such projects can help test and pilot cooperative programs before scaling them regionally and help fill ASEAN’s institutional gaps. Likewise, the 2024 agreement between the Philippines and Malaysia complements the ASCC by focusing on educational collaboration, and disaster response. This agreement aims to create a more skilled and adaptable workforce, considered crucial for post-COVID recovery and technological advancement. By sharing expertise in Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), both countries can elevate educational standards, benefiting the broader ASEAN region. Additionally, the cooperation in disaster management enhances regional resilience, aligning with the ASCC’s goals of sustainability and disaster preparedness (Office of the President of the Philippines).

Minilaterals and ASEAN: the way forward?

Minilaterals have gained prominence in the region despite the historic centrality of ASEAN for a reason. They allow more ambitious cooperation among like-minded states, help enhance security or targeted cooperation, fill enforcement gaps, and can pave the way to incubate new norms and practices for ASEAN-wide adoption.

Despite growing concern, their multiplication will not jeopardize ASEAN’s 58-year long journey nor member states’ sense of belonging from one day to the next. The expertise of ASEAN as well as its long-term ambitions, as testified to by the ASEAN Community Blueprint being planned decades ahead tell of a deeply rooted system, of which the legitimacy is in no way denied by the emergence of multilaterals.

Their rise nonetheless underscores the pressing regional challenges and the necessity for adaptive and responsive measures. Failure to address these needs could lead to substantial shifts in the geopolitical landscape, potentially undermining ASEAN’s centrality and unity. Therefore, it is crucial for minilateral agreements to align with regional values and priorities to avoid fragmentation and perceived exclusivity, ensuring they complement rather than conflict with the broader ASEAN framework.   

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