by The Foundation HDFF
on August 8, 2025

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For over five decades, the Association for South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) has prioritized political stability, economic cooperation, and regional autonomy over the development of binding regional human rights mechanisms. In a context of historical aversion to enforceable commitments due to its principles of non-interference and consensus, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights’ (AICHR) recent five-year plan signals a potential shift for the region. Under Malaysia’s chairmanship and leadership of Edmund Bon, the Commission has indeed proposed a roadmap for legally binding human rights conventions by 2030—a move that could redefine the normative foundation of ASEAN. But the region’s longstanding legal and political culture raises significant questions: Can ASEAN turn Southeast Asia’s ‘soft law’ human rights regime into a rules-based legal order? And if so, at what cost?

The ASEAN Way and Legal Minimalism: Principles and Implications

ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand amid regional tensions — particularly Indonesia’s Konfrontasi with Malaysia. Its creation aimed to reduce regional hostility, prevent foreign intervention, and promote stability amid Cold War geopolitical rivalries.

In doing so, ASEAN has embraced a unique set of legal and socio-political norms, also known as the “ASEAN Way.” The latter includes the notable principles of consensus-based decision-making, non-interference in domestic affairs, respect for state sovereignty, avoidance of contentious issues which would fragilize regional unity. These deeply-entrenched norms have long helped foster regional peace and stability.

However, they also hindered ASEAN’s ability to address transnational issues, particularly human rights, which often implicate domestic governance and challenge state sovereignty. The principle of non-interference notably prevented evaluation of countries’ respect for human rights, by rendering impossible external monitoring and scrutiny of internal governance. Furthermore, the multilateral’s financial structure further reinforces this minimalist and state-centric approach by relying on a logic of equal contributions from all member states, regardless of their economic capacity. While symbolically egalitarian, this model in reality leads to the under-resourcing of ASEAN institutions and reflects broader institutional hesitance to delegate authority or empower regional bodies. Engaging with human rights challenges at the regional level has thus not been a linear and ambitious process.

Institutional Milestones Toward Human Rights

However, the implementation of the 2004-2010 Vientiane Action Programme marked a significant shift in human rights protection within ASEAN. Member states indeed agreed to “to share information about human rights, to link any existing human rights institutions and to establish a commission to protect and promote the rights of women and children” (Karunakaren, 2017). This paved the way for more significant cooperation on human rights, as observed for instance in the 2007 ASEAN Charter’s engagement to “strengthening democracy, enhancing good governance and the rule of law, and promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms” as one of its core objectives (Karunakaren, 2017). Calls for an ASEAN Human Rights Body led to the creation of the AICHR in 2009 while the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) was adopted in 2012. Ever since, a turnover of 4-years plans has been instituted, mainly focused on “soft law” instruments, including non-binding declarations on environmental rights and development.

The current 2021-2025 vision aimed to promote “an AICHR that is responsive to the rights of the ASEAN people and promotes regional cooperation in the promotion and protection of human rights, contributing to the realization of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025” (Five-Year Work Plan of the AICHR 2021-2025, 1) by “coordinating human rights rules-based cooperation and activities; (fostering) regular dialogue on human rights with Member States and relevant stakeholders to build confidence in sharing information across member states; and Member States fulfilling international commitments in line with the principles of the ASEAN Charter” (Ibid, 2).

Measures such as non-binding decisions, although considered “soft law” and not treaties, have helped “establish a new regional standard for human rights that can influence legal outcomes” as emphasized by AICHR Chairman Edmund Bon (Scoop Insights, August 1st 2025), serving as a platform for future stronger legal frameworks. Yet, despite these achievements, AICHR today remains institutionally constrained: it lacks enforcement mechanisms, political independence and investigative powers. As a result, it has often emphasized promotion over protection.

The 2026–2030 Proposal: A Paradigm Shift?

Edmund Bon’s current proposal suggests a more assertive AICHR. The organization is indeed set to push for legally binding human rights regional instruments across within the next five years. The AICHR Chair envisions this change as a means to “address the absence of enforceable regional agreements comparable to UN international human rights conventions” (Free Malaysia Today, August 1st 2025), hence acknowledging the relative fragility of this format. This change from a political to a juridical human rights regime through legal obligation would notably aim to make Southeast Asia a torture-free zone, establish remedy mechanisms for victims of abuse and safeguard human rights defenders across the region. According to Free Malaysia Today: “another priority area (is) to introduce a formal protection mechanism that would allow the commission to issue statements on human rights violations and urge member states to stop or mitigate abuses”. Such decision stems from years-old reflection on binding human rights conventions on matters regarding women, children and people with disabilities.

Risks and Challenges for ASEAN

While transformative at the ASEAN level, such a shift would come at a structural cost. In fact, the principle of non-interference would inherently be questioned through the adoption of binding measures. Since a binding treaty would likely involve monitoring, reporting, and potentially sanctioning, state sovereignty and boundaries would be challenged, thus going against ASEAN’s very DNA. Moreover, the ASEAN way also implies unanimity among member states. Yet, in the face of a politically diverse region —from semi-democracies like Indonesia to authoritarian states like Myanmar—gaining consensus for a binding treaty appears quite the challenge. Efforts would prove especially demanding given ASEAN’s current inability —or unwillingness—to act concretely on the Myanmar crisis. (Lowy Institute)

Likewise, the current functioning of AICHR presents shortages in the face of such an ambitious and yet much-needed reform. It today lacks not only an independent secretariat and protection mandate but also institutionalized engagement with civil society, hindering its legitimacy. Finally, the AHRD and other ASEAN mechanisms today often qualify rights by balancing them with duties, national security, or local culture. But without universal norms, binding treaties could become watered-down instruments that reinforce state control rather than challenge it.

Strategic Opportunities for the region

Despite these challenges, AICHR’s proposal should not be dismissed but rather recognized for the considerable steps it represents towards lasting progress.

It would first enforce legal clarity and justiciability. Unlike existing soft-law, a binding treaty would enable judicial application at the regional and national levels, solidifying the legal status of current merely aspirational norms. It would provide enforceable rights and obligations for states and individuals as well as specific legal commitments, reducing ambiguity and state discretion, and eventually marking a reduction of human rights abuses.

With sufficient means, a binding treaty would strengthen AICHR through a clear mandate for monitoring, investigation, and enforcement. It would justify greater funding and administrative independence to guarantee an impartial protection of ASEAN member states and civilians, hence pushing for institutional reforms. Such changes could help contradicting long-standing criticisms of AICHR as merely promotional and lacking enforcement powers.

It would further promote regional legitimacy and norm consolidation. Testifying to ASEAN’s credibility as a rules-based organization, consistent with the ASEAN Charter’s commitment to rule of law, democracy, and good governance and able to react efficiently to domestic criticism over its human rights inaction—especially in cases like Myanmar, both AICHR and ASEAN’ s power would be enhanced regionally and globally.  

Finally, this binding component would empower Civil Society as well as national human rights institutions and national actors thanks to a stronger legal framework to advocate for rights, hold governments accountable, and initiate strategic litigation.

Concluding Remarks

The proposal to establish binding human rights conventions by 2030 marks a bold ambition in a region historically cautious about legalism and external scrutiny. While aspirational, it faces substantial challenges, from ASEAN’s founding principles to member states’ uneven political will.

Still, the project’s symbolic and practical importance cannot be overstated. Even if full treaty adoption is delayed or diluted, the effort itself can deepen human rights discourses, empower legal and civil society actors, and signal a growing regional expectation of accountability. AICHR’s five-year plan, if strategically implemented, may lay the foundation for the future ASEAN human rights system that is not only performative—but enforceable.

Sources:

https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2025/08/01/aichr-eyes-binding-human-rights-conventions-in-five-year-plan

Picture credit: ASEAN, Facebook.

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